A Perilous Precedent
Abandoning a robust inspection regime that was effectively containing
Iraq’s suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities,
the Bush administration has bypassed the instruments of collective
security and used massive military might to attack a state that
it considers a potential threat. Was a bloody and costly pre-emptive
war against Iraq the only option left? Does it provide a model for
denying other states access to weapons of mass destruction? No.
The war with Iraq sets a perilous precedent and a flawed formula
for dealing with other global proliferation challenges.
According to President George W. Bush, the U.S. decision to invade
Iraq outside of the UN framework was due to a “lack of will”
on the part of the UN Security Council to enforce its resolutions.
The reality is more complex. The impasse between Washington and
London and the other council members stemmed from a fundamental
disagreement about the nature of the Iraqi threat and how to deal
with it.
Never enthusiastic about the weapons inspection process, the Bush
administration tired of the mixed results of the process only weeks
after it began. The chief inspectors found little evidence to prove
the presence of or the verifiable destruction of suspected chemical
or biological weapons. In addition, inspectors discovered no evidence
of ongoing nuclear weapons work. Until the very onset of the war,
the White House could only offer circumstantial evidence of continuing
Iraqi weapons work—some of which was disproved by experts—and
dubious claims of connections with al Qaeda. The White House nevertheless
charged that Iraq represented a grave and growing threat, and it
dismissed reports of Iraqi cooperation with inspectors as a further
sign of delay and deception.
Most other Security Council members perceived no imminent or undeterrable
threat emanating from Iraq. As CIA director George Tenet reportedly
said in a letter to Bush in October 2002, Saddam Hussein was unlikely
to initiate a WMD attack against any U.S. target unless provoked.
With unfettered inspections, some missile destruction underway,
and the inspectors saying they needed several more months to complete
key disarmament tasks, most states considered immediate military
action unwarranted.
Sadly, U.S. diplomats, as well as other council members, failed
to pursue the option that could have effectively and peacefully
denied Iraq weapons of mass destruction: a strengthened inspections
regime reinforced by a clear set of disarmament benchmarks to compel
full Iraqi compliance according to a practical timetable. If Iraq
still failed to meet these tests, the United States would most likely
have been able to win Security Council support for military action
rather than undermine the council’s authority.
By invading Iraq virtually on its own, however, Washington has
reinforced fears at home and abroad that it considers itself above
the rules and norms governing international behavior and the institutions,
such as the United Nations, designed to uphold global security.
Even if the war goes according to the Pentagon’s best-case
scenarios and some chemical or biological weapons are uncovered,
the Iraq blueprint should not be applied to the other members of
Bush’s “axis of evil.”
North Korea, unlike Iraq, is on the verge of producing nuclear
bomb material. Pyongyang’s reckless nuclear brinksmanship is,
in part, fueled by fears of a pre-emptive U.S. strike and made more
difficult to address as a result of the administration’s policy
of malign neglect. Any such U.S. attack would assuredly result in
an unacceptable retaliatory attack by the North on South Korea.
To arrest the North’s nuclear program, the United States and
its allies will need to fashion a verifiable freeze through direct
talks with Pyongyang.
Iran’s rapid acquisition of peaceful nuclear technology puts
it within close reach of acquiring weapons-grade nuclear material.
The situation highlights one of the loopholes in the global nuclear
nonproliferation regime and the dangerous and overlooked effect
of Israel’s nuclear weapons program on the proliferation behavior
of rival states. Preventing Iran from acquiring the bomb will, among
other things, require more effective controls on foreign nuclear
and missile assistance—a task greatly complicated by U.S. and
Russian disagreement over the Iraq war.
These tough proliferation cases require that Washington employ
a more sophisticated, sustained, and effective style of preventive
diplomacy than it demonstrated in the run-up to the war in Iraq.
Each will require the help and assistance of U.S. allies and friends.
To prevent proliferation, the United States must pursue a comprehensive
strategy to ensure that the acquisition, possession, and use of
these weapons remains technically challenging and universally unacceptable.
This requires greater support for a multilateral framework of disarmament
and nonproliferation strategies, a willingness to work better with
others, and a degree of self-restraint not yet exhibited by this
administration.
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