North Korea Restarts Reactor; IAEA Sends Resolution to UN
Further escalating the crisis over its suspected nuclear weapons
activities, North Korea has restarted a small nuclear reactor that
had been frozen by the 1994 Agreed Framework, U.S. officials confirmed
February 27. The move came two weeks after the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) found North Korea in “further non-compliance”
with its obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
and referred the matter to the UN Security Council.
The five-megawatt reactor can produce approximately one bomb’s
worth of plutonium each year, according to a November 27 report
by the Congressional Research Service. Although the reactor poses
no immediate threat, restarting it is the most aggressive step that
Pyongyang has taken since the crisis began in October, when it allegedly
admitted to a U.S. delegation that it was pursuing an illicit uranium-enrichment
program.
North Korea’s nuclear weapons activities were supposed to
have been halted by the 1994 Agreed Framework, under which North
Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear facilities, including the
reactor, a fuel-rod fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, and
two partially completed larger reactors. In return the United States
agreed to provide two proliferation-resistant reactors and supply
North Korea with 500,000 metric tons of heating oil each year while
the reactors were under construction.
But in response to North Korea’s alleged admission of a program
to enrich uranium, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization,
the U.S.-led international consortium responsible for implementing
the Agreed Framework, announced in November that it would suspend
fuel oil deliveries to North Korea.
North Korea then announced in December it was restarting the reactor
to produce electricity. During the next few weeks, North Korea removed
seals and monitoring equipment from its nuclear facilities and ordered
IAEA inspectors, who had been charged with monitoring the freeze,
out of the country. On January 10, Pyongyang further inflamed the
increasingly tense situation by announcing that it was withdrawing
from the NPT.
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said February 27 that
North Korea’s decision to restart the reactor was “another
one of these provocative steps in the wrong direction that I think
demonstrates that North Korea’s commitments and promises are
consistently violated.”
Returning February 25 from a trip to Asia, Secretary of State Colin
Powell had told reporters that North Korea had not yet begun to
move spent fuel rods stored at the reactor site to the reprocessing
facility, and Boucher indicated that that remained the case. Powell’s
deputy Richard Armitage told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on February 4 that reprocessing the rods could yield enough plutonium
for four to six weapons. Powell said during a February 24 press
conference in Beijing that the United States would “view any
move by North Korea” to reprocess spent fuel or produce nuclear
weapons “seriously.”
North Korea said in a February 14 program on the state-owned Pyongyang
Korean Central Broadcasting Station that it withdrew from the treaty
and decided to reactivate its nuclear facilities in response to
U.S. actions, repeating charges that Washington violated the Agreed
Framework and threatened North Korea with nuclear weapons. (See
ACT, January/February 2003.)
Pyongyang also alleges that the United States is threatening to
invade North Korea and impose a blockade. A North Korean army spokesman
said February 18 that North Korea would “abandon its commitment”
to the 1953 Armistice Agreement signed at the end of the Korean
War if the United States imposes a blockade, according to a report
from the state-owned Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). A State
Department official would not say in a February 25 interview if
the Bush administration is considering such a measure.
North Korea also signaled that it might not adhere to its moratorium
on testing long-range missiles, which it extended indefinitely during
a September 17 summit between Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. North Korea’s
ambassador to China Choe Jin Su said that Pyongyang believes it
“cannot go along with the self-imposed missile moratorium any
longer,” according to a January 12 Los Angeles Times
article.
North Korea did test a missile February 24, but it was not one
covered by the moratorium. During a February 25 press conference
in Seoul, Powell called the test of the short-range, surface-to-surface
naval missile “innocuous” and said that Washington had
had advance information that it might happen.
Washington vs. Pyongyang
Pyongyang insists that it is not blackmailing the international
community or trying to gain concessions with its nuclear program,
saying in a February 19 KCNA statement that it wants an end to U.S.
“military threats” as well as efforts to “hamstring”
its economic development efforts—an apparent reference to U.S.
efforts to increase multilateral pressure on the regime. North Korea
says that the reactor will produce electricity and that it has no
intention of building nuclear weapons.
Pyongyang also continues to call for Washington to negotiate a
“legally-binding non-aggression treaty.” North Korea had
appeared to soften its demand for a treaty following its withdrawal
from the NPT, but KCNA reported January 25 that Pyongyang wanted
an agreement ratified by Congress because it does not trust the
Bush administration’s assurances of nonaggression. A February
20 KCNA statement indicated that North Korea is willing “to
clear the US of its security concern” if the United States
concludes such a treaty and “does not stand in the way of [North
Korea’s] economic development.”
In a February 25 statement, Powell reiterated that the United States
has no intention of invading North Korea but added that military
force is an “option that is always available.” He added
that Washington might “document such a statement” but
would not sign a nonaggression treaty.
U.S. officials have expressed differing views about North Korea’s
intentions. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said February
25 that North Korea is “engaged in brinksmanship…to get
rewards by the international community.”
In contrast, CIA Director George Tenet argued in a February 12
hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee that North Korea
“is trying to negotiate a fundamentally different relationship
with us…that implicitly tolerates…[its] nuclear weapons
program.” Pyongyang is “committed to retaining and enlarging
its nuclear weapons stockpile,” he added. Armitage expressed
concern during his February 4 testimony that North Korea could sell
its weapons.
Powell said February 23 that the Bush administration will not negotiate
with North Korea but that it will discuss with Pyongyang “how
it can address the international community’s concerns about
its nuclear weapons program.” Assistant Secretary of State
James Kelly said in a February 13 hearing before a House international
relations subcommittee that North Korea must dismantle both its
enriched uranium and plutonium-based nuclear weapons programs, cooperate
with the IAEA, and “come into compliance with the NPT and its
Safeguards Agreement.”
Powell said February 25 that the United States wants any talks
with Pyongyang to take place in a multilateral setting, arguing
that North Korea’s nuclear program affects many countries.
No talks have been scheduled, but Powell suggested that Washington
is communicating with North Korea via informal channels and that
such channels may be used in the future. Powell did not say whether
the United States would engage in bilateral discussions with Pyongyang
if multilateral talks began.
A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry said in a January
25 KCNA statement that Pyongyang will not participate “in any
form” of multilateral talks, insisting that only the United
States can solve the problem because its policies created the current
situation. North Korea has continued to characterize U.S. attempts
at multilateral solutions as containment. A February 18 KCNA statement
dismissed the U.S. position on dialogue as a “farce” and
a “tactic to cover up its intent to ignite a war of aggression.”
Kelly said in his February 13 testimony that the Bush administration
stands “ready to build a different…relationship”
with North Korea, including taking “political and economic
steps,” if it fulfills its disarmament requirements. Powell
suggested in his February 13 testimony that the United States would
likely address North Korea’s energy needs if a new relationship
materializes.
Since June 2001, the Bush administration has linked meetings with
Pyongyang to discuss missiles and nuclear weapons with other issues,
including conventional forces and the country’s human rights
record. Powell indicated this is still the case during a February
13 House Budget Committee hearing.
The IAEA Acts
Responding to North Korea’s rejection of two previous IAEA
resolutions, the agency’s Board of Governors adopted a resolution
February 12 declaring Pyongyang in “further non-compliance”
with its obligations under the NPT. The board decided to report
the matter to the UN Security Council, in accordance with agency
mandates.
The two previous resolutions, adopted in November and January,
called for Pyongyang to provide details about its reported uranium-enrichment
program, as well as reverse its recent decisions to expel IAEA monitors,
remove monitoring equipment and seals from nuclear facilities, and
withdraw from the NPT. (See
ACT, January/February 2003.)
The new IAEA resolution “stresses” the board’s “support”
for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. According to a February
19 UN press statement, the Security Council referred the matter
to its group of experts, who are to study the resolution and make
recommendations to the council.
A State Department official said in a February 25 interview that
Washington is consulting with allies about future Security Council
action, adding that it is “too soon to speculate” about
specific measures. Fleischer explained in a February 12 statement
that the council’s options ranged from a statement condemning
North Korea’s actions to imposing economic sanctions.
The IAEA board voted 31-0 to adopt the resolution, with Russia
and Cuba abstaining. Fleischer expressed the Bush administration’s
approval, calling the resolution a “clear indication that the
international community will not accept a North Korea nuclear weapons
program.”
U.S. allies, however, continued to resist the administration’s
approach, arguing that Washington should soon engage in bilateral
talks with Pyongyang. A February 17 statement from the Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs called the IAEA referral decision “a premature
and counterproductive step.” The statement added, however,
that Moscow had been “prepared to support the…resolution”
if a “direct dialogue” were established between Washington
and Pyongyang.
Newly installed South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun condemned North
Korea’s nuclear activities during his February 25 inauguration
speech, but he emphasized that the North Korean nuclear issue “should
be resolved peacefully through dialogue,” according to a February
25 Channel NewsAsia report.
Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan stated February 24 that China
wants the Bush administration to “begin dialogue as equals”
with North Korea, according to a February 24 Xinhua News Agency
article.
Hatsuhisa Takashima, press secretary for Japan’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, said in a February 21 statement that Tokyo’s
priority is to “maintain unity and solidarity” among Japan,
the United States, and South Korea, adding that the issue should
be “addressed with good care and caution.”
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