U.S. Stops Then Releases Shipment of N. Korean missiles
Spanish and U.S. forces intercepted and searched a ship December
9 carrying a shipment of Scud missiles and related cargo from North
Korea to Yemen. The United States, however, said it lacked the necessary
legal authority to seize the cargo and decided to allow the shipment
to be delivered.
The ship, named the So San, was unflagged, and its “name and
the indications of nationality…were obscured,” State Department
spokesman Richard Boucher said December 11. Spain’s defense
minister, Federico Trillo, said that two Spanish naval vessels stopped
the ship in the Arabian Sea on December 9, according to a December
11 Spanish media report. He added that Spanish naval personnel boarded
and searched the vessel, which was carrying a concealed shipment
of 15 complete Scud missiles, 15 warheads, and missile fuel. U.S.
naval forces also participated in the search, according to a December
11 statement from Secretary of State Colin Powell.
Spain stopped the ship at the request of the United States, according
to Boucher. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer explained
December 11 that Washington possessed intelligence that the ship
was carrying missiles to the Middle East. The United States had
been tracking the ship since shortly after it left port in North
Korea, Fleischer added, and was concerned “about where its
ultimate destination might have been,” apparently a reference
to Iraq.
The incident occurred shortly before the Bush administration publicly
issued its National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.
(See ACT, January/February 2003.) The document lists
interdicting and preventing the flow of weapons materials and technology
as part of the U.S. counterproliferation strategy.
Boucher said that the Spanish ship conducted the boarding because
“it was at the right place at the right time.” Spain contributes
naval assets to U.S. Central Command—whose area of responsibility
includes the Arabian Sea—in support of U.S. military efforts
against terrorism, according to a June 14 Defense Department fact
sheet.
Yemen protested the ship’s seizure in a December 11 letter
to the United States, saying that it had purchased the missiles
for defensive purposes, according to a December 11 report from Saba,
Yemen’s official news agency. Yemen promised that the missiles
would not be transferred to a third party, the letter added.
The ship was released after a series of phone conversations between
Vice President Dick Cheney and Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh,
as well as Powell and Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qurbi,
according to Boucher. Boucher acknowledged the assurances in Yemen’s
letter and added that Yemen had informed Washington that it would
no longer purchase missiles from North Korea. The missiles arrived
in Yemen December 14, Saba reported December 15.
Fleischer said that the United States had the authority to stop
the ship because it was unflagged but that Washington decided to
release the ship because it lacked “clear authority to seize
the shipment.” Fleischer also suggested that Yemen’s status
as an ally in anti-terrorism efforts was an important factor in
the decision, saying that Yemen “does not provide a threat
to the United States.”
The transfer of missiles, however, raised concerns about Yemen’s
relationship with North Korea. Pyongyang’s sales of missiles
and related components have long been a source of concern to the
United States. Powell called North Korea “one of the great
proliferators on the face of the Earth” in his December 11
statement.
The Scud purchase also called into question Yemen’s previous
commitments to stop purchasing missiles from Pyongyang. Boucher
said in his December 11 statement that Yemen had committed to ending
its missile purchases in 2001 and again this past August, after
the United States imposed sanctions on a North Korean corporation
and the North Korean government for transferring missile technology
to Yemen. (See
ACT, September 2002.) Yemen stated in its December 11
letter that this most recent shipment was made to fulfill contracts
“concluded very long ago”—prior to its commitments
to Washington.
When asked about the possibility of sanctioning Yemen, Boucher
indicated that Washington chose to waive sanctions this past August,
which “otherwise would have been imposed,” because of
Yemen’s assistance in combating terrorism and its agreement
to end missile purchases from Pyongyang. He added that these waivers
would likely “continue to apply.”
The North Korean Foreign Ministry condemned the interdiction of
the ship in a December 13 statement cited by the state-run Korean
Central News Agency, referring to the naval action as “unpardonable
piracy that wantonly encroached upon the sovereignty” of North
Korea.
Fleischer suggested that the incident might prompt the United States
to strengthen international controls on the transfer of missile
technology, although he did not provide additional details. The
United States is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime
and in November signed the International Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation. (See
ACT, January/February 2003.) Neither Yemen nor North
Korea are members of either regime, both of which attempt to control
the proliferation of missile technology.
