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National Strategy to Combat Weapons
Of Mass Destruction
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Amid escalating tensions with Iraq and North Korea over their
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, President George
W. Bush released on December 11 his administration’s
plans for protecting against and responding to the proliferation
of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. “We will
not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes and terrorists
to threaten our Nation and our friends and allies with the
world’s most destructive weapons,” Bush declared.
The six-page National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction is based on the classified National Security Presidential
Directive 17, which the president signed in September 2002.
That directive is official U.S. policy.
According to the strategy, the Bush administration’s
approach to dealing with weapons of mass destruction rests
upon “three pillars”: counterproliferation, nonproliferation,
and WMD consequence management.
Devoted to denying, preventing, and responding to the use
of weapons of mass destruction by other countries or terrorists,
the administration’s strategy is predicated in part on
the continued possession and possible use of nuclear weapons
by the United States.
The strategy suggests that the United States might retaliate
with a nuclear strike in response to a nuclear, chemical,
or biological attack on the United States, U.S. troops, or
friends and allies. “The United States will continue
to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming
force—including through resort to all our options—to
the use of WMD,” the strategy warns. Previous administrations
have made similar statements at various times despite a long-standing
policy not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon
states unless they attack the United States in alliance with
a nuclear-weapon state.
The strategy also forewarns countries seeking weapons of
mass destruction that the United States could attack first.
The strategy vows that the United States will seek capabilities
enabling it to “detect and destroy an adversary’s
WMD assets before these weapons are used.” In November
2002, Congress approved a Bush administration initiative to
study modifying existing U.S. nuclear weapons to destroy underground
bunkers that might be used to store WMD stockpiles.
Neither the threat to act pre-emptively nor to possibly react
to a chemical or biological attack with nuclear weapons are
novel, but the Bush administration has more openly and frequently
discussed these options than its predecessors and has now
set them out as official policy.
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Following is the text of the document:
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
December 2002
“The gravest danger our Nation faces lies
at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have
openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction,
and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.
The United States will not allow these efforts
to succeed. ...History will judge harshly those who saw this coming
danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the
only path to peace and security is the path of action.”
President Bush
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
September 17, 2002
INTRODUCTION
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear, biological,
and chemical—in the possession of hostile states and terrorists
represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United
States. We must pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this
threat in all of its dimensions.
An effective strategy for countering WMD, including
their use and further proliferation, is an integral component of
the National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
As with the war on terrorism, our strategy for homeland security,
and our new concept of deterrence, the U.S. approach to combat WMD
represents a fundamental change from the past. To succeed, we must
take full advantage of today’s opportunities, including the
application of new technologies, increased emphasis on intelligence
collection and analysis, the strengthening of alliance relationships,
and the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries.
Weapons of mass destruction could enable adversaries
to inflict massive harm on the United States, our military forces
at home and abroad, and our friends and allies. Some states, including
several that have supported and continue to support terrorism, already
possess WMD and are seeking even greater capabilities, as tools
of coercion and intimidation. For them, these are not weapons of
last resort, but militarily useful weapons of choice intended to
overcome our nation’s advantages in conventional forces and
to deter us from responding to aggression against our friends and
allies in regions of vital interest. In addition, terrorist groups
are seeking to acquire WMD with the stated purpose of killing large
numbers of our people and those of friends and allies—without
compunction and without warning.
We will not permit the world’s most dangerous
regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world’s most
destructive weapons. We must accord the highest priority to the
protection of the United States, our forces, and our friends and
allies from the existing and growing WMD threat.
PILLARS OF OUR NATIONAL STRATEGY
Our National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
has three principal pillars:
Counterproliferation to Combat WMD Use
The possession and increased likelihood of use of WMD by hostile
states and terrorists are realities of the contemporary security
environment. It is therefore critical that the U.S. military and
appropriate civilian agencies be prepared to deter and defend against
the full range of possible WMD employment scenarios. We will ensure
that all needed capabilities to combat WMD are fully integrated
into the emerging defense transformation plan and into our homeland
security posture. Counterproliferation will also be fully integrated
into the basic doctrine, training, and equipping of all forces,
in order to ensure that they can sustain operations to decisively
defeat WMD-armed adversaries.
Strengthened Nonproliferation to Combat WMD Proliferation
The United States, our friends and allies, and the broader international
community must undertake every effort to prevent states and terrorists
from acquiring WMD and missiles. We must enhance traditional measures—diplomacy,
arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance,
and export controls—that seek to dissuade or impede proliferant
states and terrorist networks, as well as to slow and make more
costly their access to sensitive technologies, material, and expertise.
We must ensure compliance with relevant international agreements,
including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC). The United States will continue to work with other states
to improve their capability to prevent unauthorized transfers of
WMD and missile technology, expertise, and material. We will identify
and pursue new methods of prevention, such as national criminalization
of proliferation activities and expanded safety and security measures.
Consequence Management to Respond to WMD Use
Finally, the United States must be prepared to respond to the use
of WMD against our citizens, our military forces, and those of friends
and allies. We will develop and maintain the capability to reduce
to the extent possible the potentially horrific consequences of
WMD attacks at home and abroad
The three pillars of the U.S. national strategy to combat WMD are
seamless elements of a comprehensive approach. Serving to integrate
the pillars are four cross-cutting enabling functions that need
to be pursued on a priority basis: intelligence collection and analysis
on WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies; research and
development to improve our ability to respond to evolving threats;
bilateral and multilateral cooperation; and targeted strategies
against hostile states and terrorists.
COUNTERPROLIFERATION
We know from experience that we cannot always be successful in
preventing and containing the proliferation of WMD to hostile states
and terrorists. Therefore, U.S. military and appropriate civilian
agencies must possess the full range of operational capabilities
to counter the threat and use of WMD by states and terrorists against
the United States, our military forces, and friends and allies.
Interdiction
Effective interdiction is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to
combat WMD and their delivery means. We must enhance the capabilities
of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities
to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise
to hostile states and terrorist organizations.
Deterrence
Today’s threats are far more diverse and less predictable than
those of the past. States hostile to the United States and to our
friends and allies have demonstrated their willingness to take high
risks to achieve their goals, and are aggressively pursuing WMD
and their means of delivery as critical tools in this effort. As
a consequence, we require new methods of deterrence. A strong declaratory
policy and effective military forces are essential elements of our
contemporary deterrent posture, along with the full range of political
tools to persuade potential adversaries not to seek or use WMD.
The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the
right to respond with overwhelming force—including through
resort to all of our options—to the use of WMD against the
United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.
In addition to our conventional and nuclear response and defense
capabilities, our overall deterrent posture against WMD threats
is reinforced by effective intelligence, surveillance, interdiction,
and domestic law enforcement capabilities. Such combined capabilities
enhance deterrence both by devaluing an adversary’s WMD and
missiles, and by posing the prospect of an overwhelming response
to any use of such weapons.
Defense and Mitigation
Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially
devastating consequences of WMD use against our forces and civilian
population, U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies
must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries,
including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures. This
requires capabilities to detect and destroy an adversary’s
WMD assets before these weapons are used. In addition, robust active
and passive defenses and mitigation measures must be in place to
enable U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies to
accomplish their missions, and to assist friends and allies when
WMD are used.
Active defenses disrupt, disable, or destroy WMD en route to their
targets. Active defenses include vigorous air defense and effective
missile defenses against today’s threats. Passive defenses
must be tailored to the unique characteristics of the various forms
of WMD. The United States must also have the ability rapidly and
effectively to mitigate the effects of a WMD attack against our
deployed forces.
Our approach to defend against biological threats has long been
based on our approach to chemical threats, despite the fundamental
differences between these weapons. The United States is developing
a new approach to provide us and our friends and allies with an
effective defense against biological weapons.
Finally, U.S. military forces and domestic law enforcement agencies
as appropriate must stand ready to respond against the source of
any WMD attack. The primary objective of a response is to disrupt
an imminent attack or an attack in progress, and eliminate the threat
of future attacks. As with deterrence and prevention, an effective
response requires rapid attribution and robust strike capability.
We must accelerate efforts to field new capabilities to defeat WMD-related
assets. The United States needs to be prepared to conduct post-conflict
operations to destroy or dismantle any residual WMD capabilities
of the hostile state or terrorist network. An effective U.S. response
not only will eliminate the source of a WMD attack but will also
have a powerful deterrent effect upon other adversaries that possess
or seek WMD or missiles.
NONPROLIFERATION
Active Nonproliferation Diplomacy
The United States will actively employ diplomatic approaches in
bilateral and multilateral settings in pursuit of our nonproliferation
goals. We must dissuade supplier states from cooperating with proliferant
states and induce proliferant states to end their WMD and missile
programs. We will hold countries responsible for complying with
their commitments. In addition, we will continue to build coalitions
to support our efforts, as well as to seek their increased support
for nonproliferation and threat reduction cooperation programs.
However, should our wide-ranging nonproliferation efforts fail,
we must have available the full range of operational capabilities
necessary to defend against the possible employment of WMD.
Multilateral Regimes
Existing nonproliferation and arms control regimes play an important
role in our overall strategy. The United States will support those
regimes that are currently in force, and work to improve the effectiveness
of, and compliance with, those regimes. Consistent with other policy
priorities, we will also promote new agreements and arrangements
that serve our nonproliferation goals. Overall, we seek to cultivate
an international environment that is more conducive to nonproliferation.
Our efforts will include:
Nuclear
- Strengthening of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including through
ratification of an IAEA Additional Protocol by all NPT states
parties, assurances that all states put in place full-scope
IAEA safeguards agreements, and appropriate increases in funding
for the Agency;
- Negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty that advances
U.S. security interests; and
- Strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee.
Chemical and Biological
- Effective functioning of the Organization for the Prohibi-
tion of Chemical Weapons;
- Identification and promotion of constructive and realistic
measures to strengthen the BWC and thereby to help meet the
biological weapons threat; and
- Strengthening of the Australia Group.
Missile
- Strengthening the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
including through support for universal adher- ence to the International
Code of Conduct Against Ballis- tic Missile Proliferation.
Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Cooperation
The United States pursues a wide range of programs, including
the Nunn-Lugar program, designed to address the proliferation
threat stemming from the large quantities of Soviet-legacy WMD
and missile-related expertise and materials. Maintaining an extensive
and efficient set of nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance
programs to Russia and other former Soviet states is a high priority.
We will also continue to encourage friends and allies to increase
their contributions to these programs, particularly through the
G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials
of Mass Destruction. In addition, we will work with other states
to improve the security of their WMD-related materials.
Controls on Nuclear Materials
In addition to programs with former Soviet states to reduce fissile
material and improve the security of that which remains, the United
States will continue to discourage the worldwide accumulation
of separated plutonium and to minimize the use of highly-enriched
uranium. As outlined in the National Energy Policy, the United
States will work in collaboration with international partners
to develop recycle and fuel treatment technologies that are cleaner,
more efficient, less waste-intensive, and more proliferation-resistant.
U.S. Export Controls
We must ensure that the implementation of U.S. export controls
furthers our nonproliferation and other national security goals,
while recognizing the realities that American businesses face
in the increasingly globalized marketplace.
We will work to update and strengthen export controls using existing
authorities. We also seek new legislation to improve the ability
of our export control system to give full weight to both nonproliferation
objectives and commercial interests. Our overall goal is to focus
our resources on truly sensitive exports to hostile states or
those that engage in onward proliferation, while removing unnecessary
barriers in the global marketplace.
Nonproliferation Sanctions
Sanctions can be a valuable component of our overall strategy
against WMD proliferation. At times, however, sanctions have proven
inflexible and ineffective. We will develop a comprehensive sanctions
policy to better integrate sanctions into our overall strategy
and work with Congress to consolidate and modify existing sanctions
legislation.
WMD CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
Defending the American homeland is the most basic responsibility
of our government. As part of our defense, the United States must
be fully prepared to respond to the consequences of WMD use on
our soil, whether by hostile states or by terrorists. We must
also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against
our forces deployed abroad, and to assist friends and allies.
The National Strategy for Homeland Security discusses U.S. Government
programs to deal with the consequences of the use of a chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon in the United States.
A number of these programs offer training, planning, and assistance
to state and local governments. To maximize their effectiveness,
these efforts need to be integrated and comprehensive. Our first
responders must have the full range of protective, medical, and
remediation tools to identify, assess, and respond rapidly to
a WMD event on our territory.
The White House Office of Homeland Security will coordinate all
federal efforts to prepare for and mitigate the consequences of
terrorist attacks within the United States, including those involving
WMD. The Office of Homeland Security will also work closely with
state and local governments to ensure their planning, training,
and equipment requirements are addressed. These issues, including
the roles of the Department of Homeland Security, are addressed
in detail in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.
The National Security Council’s Office of Combating Terrorism
coordinates and helps improve U.S. efforts to respond to and manage
the recovery from terrorist attacks outside the United States.
In cooperation with the Office of Combating Terrorism, the Department
of State coordinates interagency efforts to work with our friends
and allies to develop their own emergency preparedness and consequence
management capabilities.
INTEGRATING THE PILLARS
Several critical enabling functions serve to integrate the three
pillars—counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence
management—of the U.S. National Strategy to Combat WMD.
Improved Intelligence Collection and Analysis
A more accurate and complete understanding of the full range of
WMD threats is, and will remain, among the highest U.S. intelligence
priorities, to enable us to prevent proliferation, and to deter
or defend against those who would use those capabilities against
us. Improving our ability to obtain timely and accurate knowledge
of adversaries’ offensive and defensive capabilities, plans,
and intentions is key to developing effective counter- and nonproliferation
policies and capabilities. Particular emphasis must be accorded
to improving: intelligence regarding WMD-related facilities and
activities; interaction among U.S. intelligence, law enforcement,
and military agencies; and intelligence cooperation with friends
and allies.
Research and Development
The United States has a critical need for cutting-edge technology
that can quickly and effectively detect, analyze, facilitate interdiction
of, defend against, defeat, and mitigate the consequences of WMD.
Numerous U.S. Government departments and agencies are currently
engaged in the essential research and development to support our
overall strategy against WMD proliferation.
The new Counterproliferation Technology Coordination Committee,
consisting of senior representatives from all concerned agencies,
will act to improve interagency coordination of U.S. Government
counterproliferation research and development efforts. The Committee
will assist in identifying priorities, gaps, and overlaps in existing
programs and in examining options for future investment strategies.
Strengthened International Cooperation
WMD represent a threat not just to the United States, but also
to our friends and allies and the broader international community.
For this reason, it is vital that we work closely with like-minded
countries on all elements of our comprehensive proliferation strategy.
Targeted Strategies Against Proliferants
All elements of the overall U.S. strategy to combat WMD must be
brought to bear in targeted strategies against supplier and recipient
states of WMD proliferation concern, as well as against terrorist
groups which seek to acquire WMD.
A few states are dedicated proliferators, whose leaders are determined
to develop, maintain, and improve their WMD and delivery capabilities,
which directly threaten the United States, U.S. forces overseas,
and/or our friends and allies. Because each of these regimes is
different, we will pursue country-specific strategies that best
enable us and our friends and allies to prevent, deter, and defend
against WMD and missile threats from each of them. These strategies
must also take into account the growing cooperation among proliferant
states—so-called secondary proliferation—which challenges
us to think in new ways about specific country strategies.
One of the most difficult challenges we face is to prevent, deter,
and defend against the acquisition and use of WMD by terrorist
groups. The current and potential future linkages between terrorist
groups and state sponsors of terrorism are particularly dangerous
and require priority attention. The full range of counterproliferation,nonproliferation,
and consequence management measures must be brought to bear against
the WMD terrorist threat, just as they are against states of greatest
proliferation concern.
END NOTE
Our National Strategy to Combat WMD requires much of all of us—the
Executive Branch, the Congress, state and local governments, the
American people, and our friends and allies. The requirements
to prevent, deter, defend against, and respond to today’s
WMD threats are complex and challenging. But they are not daunting.
We can and will succeed in the tasks laid out in this strategy;
we have no other choice.
Source: The White House
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