Bare-Bones Multilateralism at the BWC
Review Conference
In July 2001 the Bush administration rejected years of work to
strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), withdrawing
from negotiations that had produced a draft of a legally binding
protocol intended to help enforce the treaty. A few months later,
on the last day of the BWC’s fifth review conference, at which
nations had hoped to adopt the protocol formally, Undersecretary
of State John Bolton demanded that the protocol negotiations be
terminated. Most other BWC parties, including many close allies,
however, felt it was crucial to continue those talks; and the review
conference had to be adjourned for 11 months to prevent a breakdown.
As November 2002 and the resumption of the conference approached,
Washington’s opposition hardened even further. In September,
Bolton informed allies that Washington not only opposed a continuation
of the protocol negotiations but also did not want any multilateral
meetings of BWC states-parties whatsoever between 2002 and 2006.
According to Bolton’s speaking points, the United States wanted
a very short second half to the fifth review conference, “if
any.” Ominously, Bolton directly threatened to “name names”—i.e.,
accuse states of violating the BWC, as he had done in 2001, and
thereby throw the conference into chaos—if the meeting was
not “very short.”
The result was what might be called a new form of multilateral
diplomacy. The second part of the fifth review conference, scheduled
to last two weeks, ended November 15, after four short days during
which less than two hours were spent in plenary session. States-parties
did agree to meet three times before the next review conference,
but the agenda for those meetings excludes the most urgent issues,
such as noncompliance, transparency, the development of so-called
nonlethal biological agents, and scientific developments that can
lead to qualitatively new biological weapons. States-parties will
also not talk about new international instruments to strengthen
the treaty. Instead, annual meetings will only discuss ways to improve
national measures and existing international mechanisms to combat
biological weapons.
Most BWC parties believe that the bioweapons ban needs to be strengthened
multilaterally. The review conferences operate by consensus, however,
and the United States opposes any multilateral talks on topics such
as transparency, verification, or compliance. Under these circumstances,
the Geneva compromise may have been the best deal achievable, but
further action is needed.
Appeasing the Bush Administration
Because of the Bush administration’s hostility to the conference,
the meeting’s principal purpose from the beginning was avoiding
spectacular failure. It was mainly up to U.S. allies in the Western
Group and the president of the review conference, Tibor Tóth,
to convince the Bush administration of the value of not letting
the conference collapse. In Tóth’s final analysis, avoiding
contentious issues was the only way to reach a compromise and meet
that goal.
The price to be paid for U.S. tolerance was high. For the first
time ever, a BWC review conference did not agree on a final declaration.
The future of talks on a verification protocol was left open and
the mandate remained untouched, but compliance with the convention
was not addressed. Instead, the conference’s only substantive
achievement was the adoption of a one-page decision that was presented
by Tóth.
Even that accomplishment was dubious. Although states agreed to
meet in each of the next three years before the 2006 review conference—equipping
the BWC with an intersessional mechanism similar to that of most
other multilateral arms control regimes—the agenda for annual
meetings was clearly and narrowly defined. The draft decision listed
the specific topics for discussion at meetings of states-parties:
- Improved national legislation and better national oversight
over dangerous pathogens will be discussed in 2003;
- Enhancing international capabilities to deal with alleged cases
of biological weapons use and strengthening and broadening national
and international efforts for disease surveillance will be on
the agenda in 2004;
- Codes of conduct for scientists will be discussed in 2005.
This list of topics drew heavily on proposals that the United States
had tabled at the opening of the review conference in November 2001.
Consistent with Washington’s position, discussion (let alone
formal negotiation) of new multilateral instruments to strengthen
the convention was not mentioned. Tóth’s proposal specified
that all meetings would reach any conclusions or results only by
consensus, giving the United States (and every other state- party)
a de facto veto over any possible outcome.
Faced with the threat of the Bush administration again sabotaging
a BWC review conference, U.S. allies decided to ignore their own
misgivings about the narrowness of the proposal. Tóth’s
paper effectively prevented any discussions on the one issue which
Europeans had consistently listed as their number one priority:
the negotiation of a legally binding and universal verification
mechanism. Western Group allies, however, concluded that nothing
more than Tóth’s modest proposal could be achieved at
the review conference.
The Bush administration, which was alone in its refusal to enter
substantive discussions, was thus conveniently shielded by its allies.
They defended Tóth’s paper as the best deal possible
under the circumstances while Washington’s role was reduced
to threatening to let the conference fail should it last too long.
Since the Eastern Group states, including Russia, signaled acceptance
of the proposal early on, all attention shifted to the nonaligned
movement (NAM) as the only possible source of opposition. Many nonaligned
states drew the conclusion that Tóth’s proposal was
better than nothing, but a few refused to agree. India, Iran, Pakistan,
Mexico, and Cuba were among those that voiced concerns about the
substance of the deal and the way it was presented. (Notably absent
from this group was China which had already signaled its willingness
to agree to the proposal.)
One NAM diplomat criticized the proposal as “not flexible
enough” because of the rigid agenda for intersessional meetings.
Others pointed out that the agenda for annual meetings provided
almost no opportunity to discuss measures to improve scientific
and technical cooperation among states-parties—a main interest
of developing countries. There were also questions about the status
of negotiations on a legally binding verification instrument and
requests for clarification of several parts of the paper. In addition,
some NAM states had misgivings about procedure and felt they had
not been properly consulted before or during the meeting.
All requests for discussion and clarification, however, were rebuffed
by the Western Group. Western states consistently presented Tóth’s
paper in Geneva as a “take it or leave it” proposal. So
great was the fear of a possible deal falling apart that the proposal
was never openly discussed in plenary session. Discussions thus
took place exclusively in closed regional group meetings, bilateral
consultations, and other informal gatherings. The president’s
role was reduced to shuttling among different meetings, informing
the groups of each other’s positions and preferences.
Faced with a unified front—South Africa as the NAM chair also
lobbied for Tóth’s proposal—critics were able to
hold out for only four days. On November 14, the conference agreed
to support the president’s original proposal. After the decision,
South Africa spoke on behalf of the NAM of the deep disappointment
at the inability of states-parties “to successfully undertake
initiatives to strengthen the convention.” The NAM put on a
brave face and celebrated the agreement as a success because it
preserved multilateralism. At the same time, NAM states emphasized
that they had gone along with the decision on the understanding
that it has many ambiguities. They also pointed out that states-parties
are free at any time to work on matters beyond the agreed agenda.
Australia, on behalf of the Western Group, emphasized that the
final product of the fifth review conference is “qualitatively
different” from previous agreements and that it “will
enable state parties to work together to enhance and strengthen
effective implementation of the BWC.” In contrast to the NAM,
Western states argued that the agreement is “clear and self-explanatory.”
The head of the U.S. delegation, Assistant Secretary of State for
Arms Control Stephen Rademaker, meanwhile, proclaimed the conference
a success. Speaking to the press, he praised the agreement as “nothing
if not multilateral.”
The Way Ahead
One challenge for the future will be to build on the limited agreement
reached at the review conference. Tibor Tóth, in his closing
remarks after the final session on November 15, called on states-parties
to look ahead and leave differences and disappointments behind.
He urged governments not to set their sights too low and to seize
the opportunities offered by the new mechanism.
In the future, strengthening the norm against biological weapons
embodied in the BWC will require progress on several tracks. It
will be essential to make best use of the opportunities offered
by the annual meetings before the next review conference. The agenda
of these meetings needs to be expanded, and some creative thinking
about ways to tackle some of the important issues currently not
listed is required.
Where it is not possible to deal with new challenges within the
BWC context, action needs to be taken elsewhere. A number of new
multilateral measures have been proposed recently, such as a new
convention to criminalize the use of biological weapons or the improvement
of United Nations mechanisms to investigate cases of biological
weapons use. Governments also need to improve national and regional
policies to prevent the misuse of biological agents. More openness
and better controls over biological agents does not always depend
on multilateral agreements. Australia’s decision to make public
the information it submitted in its confidence-building measures
under the BWC and the European Union’s plan to make such information
more widely available are two steps in this direction. Other transparency
and control measures contained in the failed verification protocol
could also be applied on a national or regional basis.
It is encouraging that other international organizations are increasing
their efforts to tackle the threat of biological weapons. For example,
during the review conference, the International Committee of the
Red Cross issued an appeal on “Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity,”
urging governments, the private sector, and the public to strengthen
their commitment to the norm against the hostile use of biological
agents.
Nongovernmental organizations will also need to reconsider their
role. It will fall on them to create attention for and pressure
on meetings of states-parties. In addition, independent experts
will need to develop specific proposals on measures to make the
bioweapons ban more effective. In the future, these organizations
and individuals will play a bigger role in monitoring the compliance
of governments and others with the norm against biological weapons
through a new, joint effort. On November 11, a group of eight nongovernmental
organizations launched the BioWeapons Prevention Project. The initiative
aims to create a global civil society network to monitor the bioweapons
ban and regularly report on relevant developments.
These different tracks—international, regional, national,
nongovernmental—will have to be pursued in parallel. Annual
meetings of states-parties should encourage, discuss, and take decisions
on issues that require political action. The vision guiding such
efforts needs to remain a universal and binding verification mechanism.
Should states-parties stick to the current, narrow agenda of annual
meetings, there is real danger such meetings—and potentially
the BWC itself—will appear less and less relevant. Then, the
Bush administration’s argument that multilateral approaches
are ineffective will have become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
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