BWC Review Conference Meets, Avoids Verification Issues
A year after the fifth review conference of the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC) was suspended amid diplomatic disarray, 94 BWC
states-parties met again November 11-15 and agreed to hold annual
meetings before the next review conference in 2006 to discuss nonproliferation
efforts. They did not, however, address the contentious issue of
adopting verification measures to enforce the treaty.
The BWC bans biological weapons but does not include any legally
binding mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance by states-parties.
In July 2001, the United States rejected a draft protocol to the
treaty, negotiated over six years by a diplomatic body known as
the Ad Hoc Group, that would have added legally binding verification
and compliance measures. Then, during the treaty’s fifth review
conference in November and December 2001, the United States called
for an end to the group and its mandate to negotiate the protocol,
throwing the conference into chaos. Conference President Tibor Tóth
subsequently suspended the conference until November 2002. (See
ACT, January/February 2002.)
Between the two conference sessions, countries discussed various
proposals for strengthening the treaty, but the United States said
in September talking points that it wanted a very short review conference
with no discussion on any topic other than meeting again in 2006.
(See
ACT, October 2002.) If states raised other issues at
the conference, the United States said it would name countries it
believes are violating the treaty and would “explicitly”
call again for the end of the Ad Hoc Group’s mandate, according
to the talking points.
In an attempt to reach a compromise, Tóth formally presented
a proposal November 11 to hold three meetings before 2006. During
those meetings, BWC states-parties will discuss several nonproliferation
measures, but the agenda does not include any plans to discuss compliance
and verification issues. The future of the Ad Hoc Group remains
unclear.
After holding regional meetings at the review conference, the states-parties
agreed to Tóth’s proposal November 14. The conference
ended without an official final declaration—usually the mark
of success for treaty review conferences—and produced only
a final document that incorporates Tóth’s proposal as
the member states’ agreement.
In 2003, states-parties will meet to discuss national mechanisms
to implement oversight of biological agents and ensure that materials
are secure. They will also consider “national measures to implement
the prohibitions set forth in the Convention,” including laws
with specific punishments for weaponizing biological agents. In
2004, states-parties will consider ways to strengthen “international
capabilities” to investigate and respond to alleged use of
biological weapons and suspicious disease outbreaks. BWC member
states will also discuss ways to enhance national and international
efforts to detect, diagnose, and combat infectious diseases. In
2005 the states-parties will discuss standards for scientists working
with biological agents.
During the meetings, the states-parties must approve any agreements
unanimously. Experts will meet for two weeks and prepare factual
reports on their work in preparation for the meetings. Finally,
“the Sixth Review Conference will consider the work of these
meetings and decide on any further action,” according to the
agreement.
The United States praised the agreement, and Stephen Rademaker,
assistant secretary of state for arms control, said it “represents
a constructive and realistic work program for the States Parties
to the Biological Weapons Convention over the next three years,”
according to a November 15 State Department release. The United
States supports the BWC, but the Bush administration believes the
BWC is “inherently unverifiable,” Rademaker said.
Some countries indicated that the agreement accomplished less than
they had hoped for. Members of the Nonaligned Movement agreed to
Tóth’s proposal, but several were reportedly reluctant.
Speaking for the nonaligned countries at the conference, a South
African delegate said the countries were “disappointed at the
limited nature of the decision that we have just taken” and
“deeply disappointed” at the states-parties’ inability
to strengthen “the implementation of the convention.”
Meanwhile, eight nongovernmental organizations launched a new BioWeapons
Prevention Project during the conference. The goal of the project
is to tap the resources of various civil society groups to track
governmental actions and scientific developments related to the
BWC in an effort to help monitor treaty compliance.
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