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Arms Control Today November 2002

NEWS BRIEFS

China Issues Chem-Bio Export Control Laws

MTCR Closes Some Loopholes

India, Pakistan Conduct Missile Tests

Russia Uses Opiate-Based Gas on Militants

G-8 Partnership Needs More Funding

No Movement on Strategic Reductions Treaty


China Issues Chem-Bio Export Control Laws

China issued a new biological export control law October 14 and a new chemical export control law October 18 in an effort to curb proliferation of agents and related equipment that could be used to develop chemical and biological weapons. The announcement of the new laws coincided with meetings between high-level Chinese and U.S. officials.

The law to control chemical exports will take effect November 19, followed by the biological export control law on December 1. Under both laws, companies must acquire a license from the government before exporting items specified on export control lists, which include dual-use biological and chemical agents and equipment. Chinese authorities can deny or approve items for export. The regulations also state penalties—including potential revocation of “licensing for their foreign trade operations”—for entities that export items on the lists without a license, lie on a license application, or otherwise violate the law.

In addition to the new export control laws, China revised regulations that were first implemented in 1998 to control the export of various military goods, including military equipment and “technologies and services for military purposes,” according to the official Xinhua News Agency. The revised regulations will take effect November 15.

The biological and chemical export control laws were passed just before and during an October 18 visit by Undersecretary of State John Bolton and Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly to meet with Chinese officials and shortly before Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited President George W. Bush in Texas October 25.

In August, China published export control regulations for missile-related equipment and technology, following numerous talks in which U.S. officials pressured the country to issue the export controls. (See ACT, September 2002.)


MTCR Closes Some Loopholes

Members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) took a step to strengthen their ability to curb cruise missile proliferation during a September 24-27 plenary meeting in Warsaw.

The MTCR is an informal export control arrangement among 33 countries that is designed to stem the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload to a range of 300 kilometers or more. The MTCR, however, did not previously define the terms “range” and “payload” or specify methods for calculating them. This omission has made it unclear whether certain missile systems are covered by the regime.

At the plenary meeting, the member states agreed to add definitions of “range” and “payload,” as well as methods for their calculation, to the MTCR’s Annex, according to a State Department official interviewed October 22. Consisting of two parts, the MTCR includes “Guidelines,” which establish a common export control policy, and an “Annex,” which lists missile-related items that each country is expected to control through its own national legislation.

Cruise missiles have been a particularly complicated issue because of the relative ease with which their range and payload can be modified—a characteristic that makes it difficult to determine the missiles’ maximum capabilities. By calculating ranges at suboptimal altitudes, some members have argued that certain cruise missiles meet the MTCR’s guidelines for export, although if flown at optimal altitudes the missiles would not meet these guidelines, Richard Speier, a former Department of Defense official, said in an October 24 interview.

The new method for calculating the range for cruise missiles reads: “for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems [a category that includes cruise missiles], the range will be determined…using the most fuel-efficient flight profile (e.g. cruise speed and altitude).” According to Speier, the decision to include this language “closed some very important loopholes.”

Cruise missiles have increasingly become a proliferation concern for the United States. A July 3 Congressional Research Service report says that “U.S. and allied forces currently face a threat from short-range, conventionally armed, anti-ship cruise missiles in the hands of a few nations” and warns that efforts to control both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of these missiles might become more difficult as the technology matures.


India, Pakistan Conduct Missile Tests

On October 4, Pakistan tested its Hatf-4 (Shaheen-1) surface-to-surface missile, which can carry a 500-kilogram payload 750 kilometers, followed by a second Haft-4 test October 8. The last time Pakistan tested a ballistic missile was in May 2002, when it tested three nuclear-capable missiles. (See ACT, June 2002.)

Hours after the October 4 test, India tested an Akash surface-to-air missile with a range of 25 kilometers. Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha said that India would not respond to Pakistan’s second test, Agence France Presse reported October 8.

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said October 4 that Washington was “disappointed” by both countries’ tests because they could contribute to a “destabilizing nuclear and missile arms race.”

India and Pakistan each accused the other of having strategic and political motivations while claiming that its own tests were driven by other considerations. Pakistan said it conducted its tests for technical reasons, a Foreign Office spokesman said in an October 7 press conference, while Pakistani Information Minister Nisar Memon accused India of engaging in an arms race, according to Agence France Presse October 4.

Indian Defense Ministry spokesman P. K. Bandhopadhyay stated that India was testing “different parameters of the missile,” the Associated Press reported October 4. Another government spokesperson dismissed Pakistan’s tests as politically motivated, saying they were “targeted at the forthcoming general elections” in an October 4 statement.

India held elections in its portion of Kashmir—a territory India and Pakistan have repeatedly fought over—in September and October to elect a new regional state assembly. Pakistan held national parliamentary elections October 10 for the first time since President Pervez Musharraf took power three years ago.

In a potentially positive sign for the region, India announced October 16 that it would withdraw some troops from the international border with Pakistan, and Pakistan followed with a similar announcement the next day. Neither country, however, announced plans to reduce the number of forces stationed along the Line of Control that divides Kashmir between the two countries.


Russia Uses Opiate-Based Gas on Militants

Russian law enforcement authorities stormed a Moscow theater October 26 after pumping gas into the building, where Chechen militants were holding more than 700 people hostage. Many hostages were rescued, but 115-117 hostages died from the effects of the gas, according to media reports.

Despite Russia’s early reluctance to name the gas, Health Minister Yuri Shevchenko said in a press conference October 30 that it was based on the opiate fentanyl. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention list fentanyl as an “incapacitating” chemical agent.

The death toll and Russia’s early reluctance to identify the gas have raised concerns that the use of the substance might violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which Russia ratified in 1997. Shevchenko said, “No chemical substances that could fall within the international weapons convention were used in the course of the operation.”

The CWC does not prohibit “riot control agents,” defined as chemicals that “can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure,” although it bans the use of such agents in warfare. Some analysts expressed concern that the gas used in the theater might violate the CWC because of the fatalities it caused.
It is unclear whether CWC member states, including the United States, which has its own “non-lethal” chemical agent program, will decide to challenge Russia’s use of the gas under the convention.


G-8 Partnership Needs More Funding

U.S. partners have formally pledged about half of the money they promised earlier this year to fund nonproliferation and disarmament projects in Russia, Undersecretary of State John Bolton testified to Congress October 9. Bolton added that legal and logistical obstacles in Russia are hindering negotiations to secure more funding.

At their meeting in June, the Group of Eight (G-8) countries created the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction—an initiative informally known as “10 plus 10 over 10”—which is intended to provide Russia with $10 billion in threat reduction funding from the United States, matched by $10 billion from G-8 and other countries, over the next 10 years. (See ACT, July/August 2002.)

Bolton reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that several large contributors have announced funding, including Germany ($1.5 billion), the European Commission ($1 billion), the United Kingdom ($750 million), and Canada ($650 million). Not all pledges that have been made have been publicly announced yet. Bolton added that countries outside of the G-8 might also choose to join the program.

Some countries have been reluctant to provide funds because previous projects have suffered from “poor coordination within the Russian government and among federal, regional, and local entities,” Bolton said.

In addition, he criticized Russia for assisting nuclear and missile programs in Iran and other countries. “Concerns about Russia’s performance on its arms control and nonproliferation commitments have already adversely affected important bilateral efforts and, unless resolved, could pose a threat to new initiatives, including the Global Partnership,” he said. Bolton urged the Russian government to take action to resolve these concerns.

G-8 senior officials are expected to meet later this year to continue discussions on threat reduction efforts.


No Movement on Strategic Reductions Treaty

Despite support from the White House, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and key Republican senators, the Senate did not act on a resolution of ratification for the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty before Congress recessed October 17. It remains to be seen whether the Senate will vote on a resolution when it reconvenes for the lame-duck session expected to begin November 12.

During an October 9 hearing, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden (D-DE) emphasized his intention to move the treaty through the Senate. “I know of no outright opposition to that treaty,” he said, adding that “it would be my intention to bring it up in the lame-duck session to get it finished.” Leading Republican Senators Jesse Helms (NC), John Warner (VA), and Richard Lugar (IN) sent a letter October 10 to Biden in support of the treaty and urged him to “finish the job before we recess the 107th Congress.”

It is unclear what is causing the delay, but wrangling over whether to add conditions to the treaty will certainly be an issue for the Senate. In addition to the joint October 10 letter, Warner wrote the Foreign Relations Committee October 21 urging that the treaty “proceed through Senate consideration unencumbered by reservations, understandings or declarations.”

But, in an October 7 report to Biden, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) cast doubt on whether the treaty should go forward without careful examination of its weak points. Calling the new strategic reductions agreement “an unusual treaty,” Levin suggested adding conditions, such as providing for Senate consultation prior to U.S. withdrawal from the treaty; encouraging the elimination of both delivery platforms and warheads; pursuing an information exchange agreement with Russia on warhead and fissile material stockpiles and associated security measures; and reporting annually on the progress made toward the treaty’s reduction goals.

Reaffirming the difficult path facing the treaty in the Senate, a U.S. official indicated that “the chances of ratification of the treaty are very slim for this year.”