The Jury Is Still Out
If ratified and implemented, the Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty signed May 24 by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin
will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear
warheads by nearly two-thirds over a 10-year period.
More than a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
end of the Cold War, the treaty aims to demonstrate the decreasing
hostility and budding friendship of the two former rivals, continuing
the trend of reducing U.S. and Russian deployed strategic arsenals
through codified agreements—a process that began with the 1991
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). Indeed, the new treaty’s
warhead limits go below those of START II and are equivalent to
those in the framework established for START III negotiations. In
this sense, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty represents
progress.
At the same time, the treaty, which totals less than 500 words,
repudiates key arms control principles and achievements, eschewing
predictability and compounding the proliferation dangers from Russia’s
unsecured nuclear weapons complex. Furthermore, when the reductions
are completed, each side will still deploy and store thousands of
strategic nuclear warheads whose only purpose is presumably to target
the other. Despite Bush administration statements that the United
States no longer needs to match Russia warhead for warhead and that
mutual assured destruction is being left behind, the number of weapons
left in play by this treaty suggests otherwise. Bush’s triumphant
claim that the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty “liquidates
the Cold War legacy of nuclear hostility” is decidedly premature.
Warhead Deployments
The treaty calls for the United States and Russia to deploy no
more than 2,200 strategic warheads each by the end of 2012. Unfortunately,
the treaty does not specify which warheads count toward the 2,200
limit, and the United States and Russia remain at odds over the
issue.
The treaty does state that the warhead limit is based on previous
Bush and Putin statements, including comments made at a November
13, 2001, joint press conference. That day, Bush said the United
States would reduce its “operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200.” Putin later replied
that Russia would “try to respond in kind.”
The Bush administration has said that “operationally deployed”
refers to those warheads assigned to ICBMs, bombers, and submarines
that are in active service but not to warheads associated with delivery
vehicles that are being overhauled or undergoing repairs. Under
the Bush administration’s counting rules, the United States
can deploy delivery vehicles that can carry several warheads, but
only those warheads actually mated to the delivery vehicle at any
given time will count toward the treaty’s limit. For example,
a 10-warhead ICBM with only one warhead actually on it would count
as only one warhead even if nine warheads stored nearby could be
loaded onto the missile relatively quickly.
Russia agrees that the limit refers to deployed (as opposed to
stored or reserve) warheads, but it had sought rules that would
count warheads according to the maximum number any deployed delivery
vehicle could carry, provisions similar to those in START I. For
example, a deployed missile that could carry 10 warheads would count
as 10 warheads regardless of how many warheads were actually on
it.
The treaty does not address the counting issue, effectively allowing
the United States to pursue its more liberal interpretation. The
Russian Foreign Ministry has explicitly stated that it does not
believe the treaty refers only to operationally deployed strategic
warheads and has indicated that Moscow expects the issue to be discussed
further in the implementation commission created by the treaty.
The United States, however, apparently considers the matter closed.
If only operationally deployed warheads are counted, meeting the
2,200 limit will require both countries to take approximately 3,000-4,000
warheads out of service, meaning they must either be dismantled
or be stored apart from their ICBMs, bombers, and submarines.
The chief value of reducing the number of deployed warheads is
that it lowers the number of warheads ready for quick use, thereby
lessening the risk of unauthorized or accidental launch. This is
a significant advance, given that Russia’s deteriorating early-warning
capability could someday lead the Kremlin to mistakenly believe
it is under nuclear attack and therefore launch a “retaliatory”
strike. Even Russia’s simple awareness of its decreased ability
to detect an attack accurately could cause heightened tension during
a crisis.
Little Predictability
During the roughly six months of treaty negotiations, the United
States insisted that each country be free to do what it wants with
its warheads and delivery vehicles to preserve the flexibility to
field larger nuclear forces in the future if warranted or desired.
For its part, Russia sought measures to make the reductions more
permanent by calling for warhead and delivery vehicle destruction.
The Bush administration’s position prevailed. The treaty does
not specify what the United States and Russia are to do with the
warheads removed from service or the delivery vehicles from which
they are separated. Moreover, under the May 24 agreement, the two
countries will be permitted to retain as many delivery vehicles
as they like—without exceeding START I limits, which will remain
in force until 2009—and, thereby, the capability to reload
warheads from storage rapidly onto existing delivery vehicles. In
fact, the Bush administration plans to keep at least 2,400 warheads
in ready reserve, some of which could be redeployed in weeks or
months and all of which could be redeployed within three years.
The result is that the treaty offers each side a great deal of
flexibility but little ability to predict the other country’s
future force structure—a central purpose of arms control. Although
neither START I nor START II, which never entered into force, mandated
warhead destruction, both treaties required the dismantlement of
delivery systems to make it harder for either superpower to redeploy
warheads removed from service quickly. The START III framework that
Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed to in 1997 called
for measures to destroy warheads to make reductions difficult to
reverse.
The ability for either the United States or Russia to predict the
other’s force level accurately will also be hampered by the
lack of a schedule for warhead reductions. This could undermine
confidence that either side intends to carry out the reductions
in a timely fashion, or at all. Whereas START spelled out specific
benchmarks by which progress could be measured during implementation,
the new agreement merely sets out an ultimate objective. Moreover,
the date that the treaty’s limit of 1,700-2,200 deployed warheads
is to take effect—December 31, 2012—is also its expiration
date.
Further undermining predictability is the uncertainty about how
the reductions will be verified. The treaty states that START I,
which has an intrusive and extensive verification regime, will remain
in force. But the new treaty does not state that the START I verification
regime will be used to confirm that the reductions are taking place.
In a May 24 joint declaration, the two presidents stated that START
I will “provide the foundation for providing confidence, transparency,
and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions, along
with other supplementary measures, including transparency measures,
to be agreed.” But U.S. officials report as of the end of May
that there have been no decisions on which elements of the START
I regime will be used to verify the new reductions.
In addition, START I and its verification regime are set to expire
three years before the new reductions are to be achieved, leaving
open the question of how final compliance with the new treaty’s
terms will be verified.
More Drawbacks
One strategic concern is that the treaty allows multiple independently
targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on land-based missiles, reversing
a significant accomplishment of START II. U.S. negotiators had long
sought a ban on land-based MIRVs because they are both lethal weapons
and attractive targets—a single ICBM could be used to destroy
many enemy targets, but a single enemy warhead could destroy many
warheads on the ground if they were mated to a single MIRVed missile.
The result is destabilizing because in a crisis either side would
be tempted to attack pre-emptively, calculating that it had to use
its nuclear forces first or else risk losing them.
Although current U.S.-Russian relations make such a crisis scenario
unlikely in the near future, Russia is expected to rely increasingly
on land-based MIRVs to field its 1,700-2,200 warheads. This force
posture could give the United States the potential for a first-strike
capability—or could simply give the Russians this perception—particularly
if the United States successfully fields an effective national missile
defense.
From a proliferation standpoint, the treaty compounds the post-Soviet
danger of “loose nukes.” By permitting Moscow to store
warheads removed from service rather than mandating their dismantlement,
the treaty will add weapons to Russia’s vast complex of nuclear-warhead
and weapons-usable-material storage sites, some of which lack modern
security, have poor accounting methods, and are protected by underpaid
guards. Adding more warheads to be watched, as well as maintained,
will increase the demands on a system that is already financially
and technically challenged and that is already considered a potential
source of nuclear weapons for terrorists or rogue states.
Indeed, with Washington and Moscow working toward friendlier relations,
the warheads Russia keeps in storage—not the ones it deploys
on its ICBMs, bombers, and submarines—may well be the greater
nuclear threat to the United States.
Destination Unknown
If the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty is assessed solely
for what it is, it can be welcomed as another step in reducing deployed
U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arsenals. But it is difficult to
ignore what the treaty is not, as well as what it could have been,
given warming U.S.-Russian relations and the outlines for START
III. And, as discussed above, the new treaty could have unintended
consequences whose danger is difficult to gauge at this time.
The terms of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty allow for
the accord to be extended and improved, and the treaty establishes
a Bilateral Implementation Commission that will meet at least twice
per year. This body could serve as a forum to address some of the
treaty’s shortcomings.
Unfortunately, indications from the Bush administration, which
initially opposed even codifying strategic reductions, suggest that
this treaty will not be used as a stepping stone to further arms
control and that the Bilateral Implementation Commission will not
be used for much, at least not while George W. Bush is president.
In fact, the Bush administration may see this treaty as its first
and last arms control agreement. Commenting on the strategic reductions
agreement and the upcoming U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, Secretary of State Colin Powell said May 15 that
U.S.-Russian “strategic issues are taken care of now.”
How the treaty will be perceived within the context of the global
nuclear nonproliferation regime is an important issue that is unanswerable
for now. Completion of the accord could be seen as another step
by the United States and Russia toward fulfilling their Article
VI nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty commitment to “pursue negotiations
in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race.” Yet the Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty’s lack of provisions for dismantling and eliminating
warheads as well as delivery vehicles contradicts a pledge made
by the nuclear-weapon states in May 2000 to apply the principle
of irreversibility to arms control measures.
Whether the treaty proves to be a net gain or loss for U.S. security
and international stability depends in large part on how Russia
chooses to deploy its remaining forces, how secure the storage or
dismantlement of its downloaded warheads are, and how the relationship
between Washington and Moscow evolves. Until such questions can
be answered, a final verdict on the treaty’s value will have
to wait.
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