Pakistan Tests Three Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missiles
Pakistan tested three different nuclear-capable ballistic missiles
in May—its first tests since 1999. The tests come during a
tense standoff between the Indian and Pakistani militaries over
the disputed province of Kashmir, prompting international concern
that if war breaks out, it could result in a nuclear exchange.
On May 24, Pakistani Information Minister Nisar Memon announced
that his country would conduct a series of “routine” missile
tests that were “part of technical requirements” and unrelated
to the military confrontation in Kashmir. Islamabad gave advance
notice of the tests to India, the United States, and several other
regional and European states.
The following day, Pakistan flight-tested for the third time its
1,300-kilometer-range, liquid-fueled, road-mobile Haft-V missile,
also known as the Ghauri. At a May 25 press conference, Memon said
the test “reinforced the effectiveness and technical excellence
of Pakistan’s indigenous missile technology.”
However, a December 2001 CIA report implied that the missile is
actually a North Korean Nodong-1. Shortly after the test, Indian
Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Nirupama Rao also disputed Pakistan’s
claim that it had indigenously developed the missile, claiming,
“Pakistan has acquired the technology and the material for
its missiles program clandestinely.”
On May 26, Pakistan tested its 290-kilometer-range, solid-fueled,
mobile Hatf-3 missile, a first for that particular missile, according
to Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations Directorate.
The directorate said the missile is also called the Ghaznavi, a
name that the U.S. Defense Department has previously attributed
to a 2000-kilometer, solid-fueled missile that is similar or perhaps
identical to Pakistan’s Shaheen-2.
Two days later, Pakistan completed its testing series by firing
a 180-kilometer-range, solid-fueled, mobile missile known as the
Haft-2, or Abdali.
India responded with a quick but relatively muted reaction. At
a May 24 press conference, Rao downplayed the forthcoming tests,
saying they were “missile antics, clearly targeted at the domestic
audience in Pakistan.” Rao added, “One fails to understand
why Pakistan has chosen this moment to deplete one of the ready-made
missiles in its stock.”
Even though the tests came at a time of high tension, the South
Asian rivals appear to have abandoned their previous tit-for-tat
missile-testing cycle. India has yet to respond to this series of
tests with missile flight tests of its own, and Pakistan did not
conduct tests in response to India’s January 2001 and January
2002 missile tests.
Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed “disappointment”
at Pakistan’s decision to conduct missile tests amid such high
tensions. In a May 26 interview on CNN’s Late Edition, Powell
acknowledged that although the testing series “doesn’t
seem to have caused the crisis to get any worse,” the region
“just didn’t need this kind of activity at this time.”
Two days before Powell’s remarks, State Department spokesman
Philip Reeker said the United States will “continue to urge
both sides to take steps to restrain their missile programs and
their nuclear weapons programs.” These steps could include
not deploying operational nuclear-armed missiles and restarting
a dialogue on “confidence-building measures that could reduce
the likelihood that any such weapons ever be used.”
The two sides suspended this dialogue in May 1999, when a military
altercation in the mountains above Kargil, Kashmir, heated up. According
to a recent paper by Bruce Riedel, a senior director in the Clinton
administration’s National Security Council, U.S. officials
had received information that Pakistan’s military was preparing
to arm its missiles with nuclear warheads during that crisis, without
the knowledge of then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
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