A Beginning, Not an End
The May 24 signing of the new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin is a welcome, though
incomplete, step toward reducing U.S. and Russian nuclear dangers.
In their zealous pursuit to maintain strategic nuclear flexibility
well into the next decade, U.S. negotiators have spurned a historic
opportunity to verifiably eliminate excess nuclear weaponry, leaving
behind numerous dangers that demand further action.
The new agreement is short. It requires each side to reduce its
number of deployed strategic warheads to no more than 2,200 by 2012.
It places no restrictions on strategic missiles and bombers and
allows each side to determine the composition of its deployed nuclear
forces. The treaty does not spell out what is to be done with warheads
removed from service.
The White House asserts that this formulation suits the more amicable
U.S.-Russian relationship. But the treaty’s limited scope and
lack of detail reflect the fact that negotiators simply could not
agree on core issues, including how to count deployed warheads.
On the whole, the new treaty does not significantly alter the number
of existing nuclear delivery systems and therefore only marginally
affects the residual nuclear potential of the United States and
Russia. The allowance for storage of thousands of reserve warheads
undercuts the treaty’s verifiability and makes it more difficult
to forecast future force levels. The agreement’s emphasis on
flexibility detracts from its predictability, lessening its value
in building a more stable and secure U.S.-Russian relationship.
As the Senate reviews the treaty in the coming weeks, it will surely
applaud the treaty’s mandate for deployed nuclear force reductions.
But the Senate should also press the administration to explain the
gaps left in the treaty text and seek action from Bush on a more
comprehensive and effective nuclear risk reduction strategy vis-à-vis
Russia.
First, the Senate should examine why the old premises of Cold War
nuclear targeting continue to dictate the size of the U.S. arsenal.
Clearly, the United States and Russia are no longer enemies and
have no reason to go to war, but the Bush administration’s
proposed nuclear force size and posture are still very much based
on deterring and defeating Russia’s nuclear and conventional
military forces. As a result, the condition of mutual assured destruction
persists. Absent such requirements, there is no plausible threat
scenario that requires the deployment of more than a few hundred
nuclear warheads, let alone 2,200, with thousands more available
for rapid redeployment.
If Putin follows Bush’s policy of warehousing, rather than
eliminating, excess warheads, the long-term burden of safeguarding
Russia’s already vast and insecure nuclear weapons complex
will only grow. The United States should pursue a policy of minimizing
reserve forces and offering Russia more assistance to safeguard
and demilitarize their excess warheads and nuclear materials.
The treaty promises to remove some but not all strategic warheads
from ready launch status. Consequently, the Senate should press
the administration to seek further operational changes in the alert
status of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces to guard against the risk
of accidental launch or miscalculation.
Though verification provisions from the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty will remain in effect until 2009, the new treaty provides
no additional verification or transparency measures. Proposals to
expand data sharing and improve monitoring of treaty compliance
were on the table, but the two sides failed to close a deal. Senators
should task U.S. negotiators to work with Russia on new mechanisms
to enhance transparency and establish a better baseline on weapons
holdings through the Bilateral Implementation Commission established
by the new treaty.
Given the pursuit of nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations,
it is troubling that Russia retains thousands of poorly accounted-for
tactical warheads, which are relatively more vulnerable to theft
or diversion than strategic warheads. For now, tactical nuclear
weapons are not a top Bush administration priority. Meanwhile, the
administration is contemplating the development of new types of—and
new uses for—tactical nuclear weapons, a policy that only makes
the control of such weapons more challenging. Negotiations leading
to the verifiable elimination of tactical nuclear weapons should
be high on the U.S.-Russian agenda.
National security adviser Condoleezza Rice has said that the new
treaty is “a transitional measure to a day when arms control
will play a very minor role in U.S.-Russian relations, if a role
at all.” But because this treaty fails to lock in strategic
nuclear reductions and does not address the vast array of other
Cold War-era dangers, that day remains far too distant. The task
now is for the United States and Russia to pursue the much-needed
next steps with a more comprehensive and lasting nuclear risk reduction
strategy.
|
