Bush Refuses to Certify Russian Chem-Bio Compliance
The White House notified Moscow in early April that President George
W. Bush cannot certify Russia’s compliance with chemical and
biological arms control accords, stalling the implementation of
joint programs to ameliorate the threat posed by Russia’s weapons
of mass destruction complex.
The law funding the Defense Department’s Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs requires the president to annually certify that
Russia is “committed” to several key standards, such as
“complying with all relevant arms control agreements”
and “observing internationally recognized human rights.”
Similar requirements apply to threat reduction efforts under the
purview of the State and Agriculture departments.
The Bush administration conducted its first certification review
earlier this year and identified “serious concerns about Russian
chemical and biological weapons activities,” according to the
National Security Council (NSC). Failure to certify Russian compliance
means that new funds cannot be allocated for threat reduction programs
managed by the affected departments.
In interviews, administration officials described a broad set of
concerns. A key State Department official cited the low level of
access Russia has provided to its “military biological weapons
facilities,” concerns that Russia retains the ability to manufacture
biological weapons agents, the fact that former offensive biological
weapons personnel continue to occupy key defense establishment posts,
and the fact that Russia has not accommodated a U.S. desire for
high-level bilateral meetings to discuss biological weapons.
On the chemical weapons front, the official highlighted concerns
over the completeness of Russia’s chemical weapons declarations
under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the U.S. contention that
Russia has yet to provide a satisfactory plan for the destruction
of its chemical weapons stockpiles. Russia presented a plan to the
convention’s implementing body last September, but U.S. officials
appear to view that plan as insufficient.
The Clinton administration had similar concerns but chose to certify
Russian compliance annually. According to Elisa Harris, director
for nonproliferation and export controls on the Clinton administration’s
National Security Council, President Bill Clinton chose to certify
“because it was the judgment of all of the relevant agencies—Defense,
State, Energy, etc.—that President Yeltsin and the Russian
government were committed to complying with their arms control obligations.”
Asked to comment on the disparity between the Clinton and Bush
administration’s policies, the State Department official said
the Bush administration “takes both the certification requirement
and concerns over Russia’s chemical and biological activities
very seriously.”
The administration notified key members of Congress of the noncertification
in mid-March and told their Russian counterparts of the finding
through multiple diplomatic channels in early April, according to
the official.
The efforts affected by the decision include the Defense Department’s
Cooperative Threat Reduction program; the International Science
and Technology Center, which incorporates both State and Agriculture
Department efforts; and the State Department’s export control
and border security initiatives.
The Energy department’s nonproliferation programs in Russia
are not subject to similar certification requirements, and all of
them will continue without disruption, the National Security Council
said.
According to State Department officials and the NSC, the affected
threat reduction programs can continue to spend obligated funds,
but funding cannot be allocated for new efforts. One State Department
official indicated that relatively few programs are being curtailed
at the present time but that the number of initiatives affected
“is increasing daily as current contracts expire.”
The previous certification review was conducted in the final months
of the Clinton administration, and the resulting certification was
delivered to Congress on January 20, 2001, according to the State
Department official. The Bush administration had to certify the
programs one year after that, and as a result, the Bush administration’s
failure to certify Russian compliance technically began to impede
threat reduction efforts after January 20 of the current year.
In order to allow threat reduction programs to continue, the administration
is seeking authority from Congress to waive the certification requirement’s
provisions. In a 2002 emergency supplemental appropriations request
submitted to Congress March 21, the administration requested relief
from the certification requirement “if the President certifies
in writing…that waiving such restrictions is important to the
national security interests of the United States.”
According to the National Security Council, “While we seek
a waiver, the administration will continue to work intensively at
senior levels with Russia to resolve our concerns with its arms
control behavior.”
In interviews, administration officials were hopeful that Congress
would approve the waiver authority in the near future. Speaking
at an April 23 Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Senator Richard
Lugar (R-IN), a leading proponent of threat reduction programs,
called the curtailment of new projects “a dangerous situation”
and expressed hope that the Congress “will respond quickly
by granting this waiver.”
But Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), the ranking member on the Foreign
Relations Committee, appeared to support curtailment of threat reduction
efforts in an April 18 letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell.
“It makes no sense for the United States to fund threat reduction
programs helping Russia meet her international obligations if Moscow
continues to pursue illicit WMD [weapons of mass destruction] programs
with freed-up Russian funds,” the senator argued.
It remains unclear whether Congress will approve the waiver authority
in time for a late May summit in Moscow at which Presidents Bush
and Vladimir Putin are expected to discuss a broad range of issues,
including threat reduction. Administration officials declined in
interviews to commit to utilizing a waiver if and when Congress
grants such authority.
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Alexander Yakovenko
responded to the noncertification in an April 9 statement, saying
that Washington’s actions had “seriously perplexed”
his government. Yakovenko argued that “Russia has been undeviatingly
abiding by the provisions” of the biological and chemical accords
and said, “If questions arise…they should be solved through
the existing mechanisms of bilateral and multilateral consultations.”
Claiming Washington had ulterior motives for the noncertification,
Yakovenko said the U.S. move was intended “to distract attention
from the actions of the U.S. itself,” citing U.S. opposition
to a compliance protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention and
recent U.S. moves to oust the head of the Chemical Weapons Convention’s
implementing organization. (See ACT,
September 2001 and Chemical
Weapons Convention Chief Removed at U.S. Initiative.)
Yakovenko alleged that Washington was not providing “concrete
facts” to support its allegations. He warned of possible ramifications,
saying, “Such actions may have a most adverse effect on achieving
mutual trust,” impacting cooperative efforts on nonproliferation
and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.
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