U.S. Presents Alternatives to BWC Protocol at Review
Conference
In a November 19 statement at the fifth Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC) review conference in Geneva, the United
States formally presented proposals to strengthen the convention,
which outlaws germ weapons but lacks verification measures.
The Bush administration promised to develop its plan
in July after it opposed a draft of—and any future negotiations
on—an internationally negotiated protocol to strengthen the
treaty’s enforcement. The United States was the only country
to oppose the draft, which had been over six years in the making,
provoking international criticism.
Perhaps the biggest difference between the draft protocol
and the U.S. plan concerns legal status. The protocol would be legally
binding, while the administration simply plans to incorporate its
ideas in the review conference’s final document, which will
be politically binding but will not have the force of international
law.
Washington’s package also leaves out some of
the protocol’s most significant provisions. Absent from the
proposal is the protocol’s plan to establish an international
implementing body that would have the power to conduct challenge
investigations of suspicious facilities, collect declarations of
treaty-relevant facilities, and perform routine, nonintrusive “visits”
to declared facilities.
However, the U.S. package does retain some of the
protocol’s measures. For instance, the plan would require BWC
member states to enact domestic legislation criminalizing treaty-prohibited
activities. According to a European official, about half of the
BWC’s member states do not have such laws.
The U.S. package would also expand the UN secretary-general’s
mandate to investigate suspected biological weapons use by allowing
the secretary-general to also examine suspicious disease outbreaks,
an idea contained in the protocol. Furthermore, Washington’s
proposals would elaborate vague BWC provisions for clarifying and
resolving compliance concerns. This would involve voluntary exchanges
of information or visits to sites in question. The protocol included
similar measures that, unlike the U.S. plan, allowed for obligatory
on-site visits.
Like the protocol, the Bush administration’s
proposals also envision states supporting World Health Organization
efforts to monitor and respond to global disease and contributing
to an international team that would provide assistance “in
the event of a serious outbreak of infectious disease.” In
addition, the U.S. plan would require states to “report internationally”
biological releases or “adverse events that could impact other
countries,” a suggestion similar to measures resulting from
past review conferences and contained in the protocol.
A number of the U.S. suggestions go beyond what the
protocol would have included. For instance, Washington would like
to make it easier to extradite criminals involved in biological
weapons crimes. It also wants to require states-parties to adopt
and implement “strict regulations for access to particularly
dangerous microorganisms.”
The U.S. plan also calls for states to “sensitize
scientists to the risks of genetic engineering” and to “explore
national oversight of high-risk experiments.” In addition,
states would adopt a code of conduct for scientists working with
pathogenic microorganisms and implement “strict biosafety procedures.”
The United States has said that BWC member states
could meet after the review conference to discuss implementing the
measures it has suggested and to consider other proposals to strengthen
the convention. However, the United States is not willing to continue
meetings of the Ad Hoc Group, the international body that negotiated
the protocol, according to an administration official.
The official said that, although talks on implementation
would include the same participants as the Ad Hoc Group had, Washington
would consider the two separate processes. Starting “afresh”
with new talks would be more productive, the official said.
Initial International Response
The United States is having difficulty obtaining support
for its proposals at the review conference, which began November
19 and ends December 7. According to a source in Geneva, most of
the delegations at the conference would like to conclude a multilaterally
agreed, legally binding measure that would enhance compliance with
the convention. Many countries would also like to take time to review
the U.S. proposals and then discuss them, and other suggestions,
at a later time.
“These things are generally difficult to agree
on at a review conference because of the short, short time period,”
the source said, adding that, if the U.S. proposals were agreed
to at the conference, then it would be difficult for other countries
to pressure Washington to accept other ideas.
Prior to the conference, Washington had briefed its
allies and World Health Organization officials on its proposals.
According to the Bush administration official, Washington received
a favorable general reaction. Some countries wanted to go beyond
U.S. recommendations in some areas, the official said, but there
was a “general acceptance” that the protocol negotiations
are “not a basis for further work.”
However, other diplomatic sources say that these favorable reactions
to the U.S. plan were contingent on Washington remaining open to
the Ad Hoc Group’s continuation, even if the group does not
conduct negotiations on the protocol.
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