International Reaction to Secret U.S. Bio-Weapons Research Muted
Recent revelations regarding secret U.S. biological weapons research
have met with little international reaction despite concerns over
whether the programs violate U.S. commitments under the 1972 Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC).
The disclosures, which were first reported in the September 4 New
York Times, detailed U.S. development of a biological-agent
production facility and a model biological bomb, as well as plans
to produce a new strain of anthrax. The BWC outlaws development
and possession of biological agents and weapons for offensive purposes
but permits defensive activity.
The reports came just weeks after the United States rejected an
internationally negotiated enforcement protocol intended to strengthen
the BWC, instead saying that it would present alternative proposals
for increasing compliance with the treaty. (See ACT,
September 2001.)
European states, which have staunchly supported the protocol, have
remained silent about the reports. According to a European official,
the European Union has not yet officially discussed the recent disclosures.
But another European official said that many Europeans are concerned
about the revelations, which the official said are “going to
make it much easier for others to claim that work they are doing
is legitimate biodefense work.”
The official added, “If the U.S. administration had seen such
work underway in other countries, then it would be the first to
point the finger that this is questionable. And what this does is
makes the gray areas grayer still between offense and defense, and
that doesn’t help.” The official said that Western governments
would bring up this point privately despite assurances from Washington
that its programs are “legitimate and permitted under the convention.”
The official also said that the disclosures could make it difficult
for the United States to sell its promised proposals on how to move
beyond the protocol process at an upcoming BWC review conference,
scheduled to begin in November. However, the September terrorist
attacks on New York and Washington could decrease criticism of U.S.
proposals, the official said.
According to The New York Times report, the United States embarked
on an effort to develop a modified anthrax strain after it learned
of a reported Russian effort to develop the anthrax but failed to
subsequently obtain the strain from Moscow. At a September 4 briefing,
Defense Department spokesperson Victoria Clarke said that the U.S.
request for the anthrax is still pending a decision by Russia’s
Export Control Commission.
Clarke also said the Defense Department plans to use the anthrax
strain to test it against U.S. anthrax vaccine. She said that the
department has not yet produced the strain and that it does not
plan to begin work until interagency consultations, legal reviews,
and congressional briefings are concluded. Clarke added that the
reviews completed so far indicate that the work would be BWC compliant.
In another project, the Defense Department built a biological-agent
production facility in Nevada using commercially available parts,
reportedly to demonstrate how easy it would be for others to construct
such a plant. The project also apparently aimed to assess whether
small production facilities produce “signatures” that
could be used for identification purposes. Clarke said that the
Nevada plant produced only simulated biological agents, which are
benign.
In a third program, the CIA reportedly built and tested a model
of a Soviet-designed biological bomb to see how well it dispersed
agents. The agency had feared the bomb was for sale on the international
market and decided to build its own model after efforts to obtain
the bomb on the market failed. The model did not have a fuse or
other weapons-related parts that would make it an operational bomb,
intelligence officials told The New York Times.
When asked whether maintaining the confidentiality of the U.S.
programs was related to the United States’ rejection of the
draft protocol, Clarke said, “Absolutely not.” She maintained,
“The protocol has lots of problems recognized by lots of people
other than us. Foremost among them, it would make it very hard to
do biodefense.”
At a September 4 briefing, White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer
argued that the U.S. “defense” effort is “fully in
accordance with the Biological Weapons Convention.” To this,
Clarke added, “All of the work is thoroughly briefed and gone
through a heavy consultation process, both interagency and the appropriate
legal reviews and the appropriate congressional briefings.”
Mary Elizabeth Hoinkes, former general counsel of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, disputed this reading of the BWC, telling
The New York Times September 5 that it is a “gross misrepresentation”
that “risks doing serious violence” to the convention.
Ambassador James Leonard, head of the U.S. delegation to the BWC
negotiations, said that, even if the U.S. activities were illegal,
it would not have much of an impact on the course of events. “Marginal
violations of a treaty, where it’s arguable whether it has
been violated, don’t really become big issues unless they are
picked up by some party for rather extraneous reasons,” Leonard
said.
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