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The Rogue Elephant
To much of the world, the United States is emerging as an irrational
rogue state that is increasingly out of step with the rest of the
international community. The starkest example of a growing U.S.
unilateralism and undisguised contempt for the views of others is
the administration’s approach to national missile defense (NMD)
and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In order to facilitate
its pursuit of an NMD, the United States has by now made it clear
that it intends to eliminate the ABM Treaty, whatever the consequences.
Promised discussions with Russia, China, and U.S. allies have turned
out to be simply briefings on U.S. testing plans, which the administration
claims will conflict with the ABM Treaty “in months.”
The administration’s actions following the apparently successful
personal interaction between President George W. Bush and Russian
President Vladimir Putin in June and July underscore that the administration’s
pursuit of national missile defense has become an irrational obsession
and not simply a misguided policy. A steady stream of senior U.S.
officials has descended on Moscow and reciprocal visits have been
encouraged. Great care has been taken, however, to emphasize that
these are not negotiations or even discussions, but simply “exchanges
of information” intended to persuade Russia that it has nothing
to fear from U.S. NMD plans.
The administration is brashly proposing that Russia should join
in repudiating the ABM Treaty, which Moscow strongly supports as
the foundation of strategic stability. Putin and other senior Russian
officials complain that they have received no information on the
extent of the U.S. NMD program or future strategic offensive force
levels, which U.S. officials say must await the current nuclear
policy review. In addition, U.S. representatives have not made clear
what, if any, formal agreement might replace the ABM Treaty. Russian
officials, including Putin, have stated they are not interested
in signing a “blank check” and see no possibility of resolving
such a complex issue in time to celebrate agreement at the November
summit at Bush’s Texas ranch. Whether the U.S. approach represents
the irrational expectations of true believers or is simply a ploy
to create an excuse for unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty remains to be seen. But unilateral U.S. withdrawal has garnered
no international support, including from close U.S. NATO allies,
who have been treated to similar condescending briefings.
While tied to its obsessive NMD craving, the administration’s
desire to eliminate the ABM Treaty also reflects its fundamental
opposition to all formal arms control treaties. The administration
sees such agreements as constraining U.S. flexibility to use its
superior technology and economic resources to achieve unchallenged
military superiority. Confident of substantial U.S. advantage, it
has no interest in constraining the forces of potential adversaries.
In this spirit, the administration has dismissed the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty and is not concerned by Putin’s assertion that
U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would force Russia to withdraw
from START II and even START I. This would eliminate the basis for
verifying strategic reductions and allow Russia to retain its land-based
MIRVs, including the 10-warhead SS-18 and SS-24 missiles, as well
as future replacement MIRVed missiles. This rejection of formal
treaties in general and particular disdain for the ABM Treaty because
it is a “30-year-old Cold War relic” seems odd for an
administration that wants to expand the Cold War NATO alliance to
the borders of its new friend.
The administration now plans to unleash the same officials to persuade
China that the U.S. NMD would not be a threat. If these briefings
are anything like those given to Congress, U.S. allies, and Russia,
setting forth a technological buffet from which the United States
will construct a multi-layer defense, China will hardly be persuaded
that such an undertaking, costing a few hundred billion dollars,
is really directed at North Korea. To sweeten this bitter pill,
the administration leaked that China would be informed that the
United States was prepared to accept modernization of Chinese nuclear
forces and would not object if China resumed nuclear testing, which
the United States might also find necessary. When this proposal
was widely greeted with shocked incredulity, it was denied by another
senior official—in the cacophony of contradictory statements
that have characterized exposition of U.S. foreign policy.
Having predictably failed to intimidate Russia to join in a crash
program to dismantle the ABM Treaty and having found absolutely
no international support, President Bush should re-evaluate the
wisdom of this approach. Recalling the metamorphoses of Presidents
Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan to support arms control during their
presidencies, influential Republican leaders should come to the
aid of the Grand Old Party and persuade President Bush to adopt
a less confrontational posture and avoid branding his presidency
and his party as a Rogue Elephant.
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