NEWS BRIEFS
United States Sells Missiles to Thailand
Countries Conclude Balkan Talks
African States Extend Light Weapons Moratorium
Pentagon Clarifies South Asia Nuclear Policy
Bush Team Shies From Clinton Landmine Policy
Israel Cancels Radar Deal With China
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act Renewed
NATO Collects Weapons in Macedonia
Putin Approves Spent-Fuel Import Legislation
Bush Waives Nuclear Sanctions Against Pakistan
Last Minuteman III Missile Silo Destroyed
Moscow Seeks Five-Way Strategic Stability
Talks
North Korea Refuses to Resume Talks With U.S.
United States Sells Missiles to Thailand
In early July, the State Department approved the sale of an undisclosed
number of AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs)
to Thailand. But the Pentagon will not deliver the missiles unless
another Asian country acquires a similar capability because U.S.
arms transfer policy restricts Washington from being the first to
introduce advanced weaponry into a region. The United States has
the same arrangement with Singapore and Taiwan.
A defense official said the total number of AMRAAMs was approximately
30. If delivered, Thailand will use them to arm F-16A/B fighter
jets it previously acquired from the United States. AMRAAMs have
a maximum range of roughly 75 kilometers and an autonomous radar
enabling a pilot to “fire and forget.”
Official details of the sale are not available because its total
value does not exceed the threshold requiring congressional notification.
Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, arms sales equaling or exceeding
$14 million must be reported to Congress, which could block the
sale by passing a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 days
of notification (15 days in the case of NATO members, Australia,
Japan, and New Zealand).
Countries Conclude Balkan Talks
On July 18, 20 countries, including the United States, wrapped
up more than two years of troubled negotiations aimed at bolstering
confidence- and security-building measures among states in and around
the war-torn Balkans. However, the talks’ final four-page document
is modest, consisting mostly of voluntary steps countries may take
to build on existing commitments.
Article V of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, which ended fighting
among Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, called for negotiations “establishing a regional
balance in and around the former Yugoslavia.” A chairman for
these talks was not appointed until December 1997, and it took Article
V participants, including all the countries in southeastern Europe
and other interested countries, nearly a year to agree on a mandate.
They ultimately decided not to negotiate an arms control treaty
capping weapons levels.
Instead, the talks’ objective became obliging Yugoslavia to
undertake commitments similar to those in the Vienna Document. A
product of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), the Vienna Document aims to foster transparency and cooperation
among the now-55 OSCE member states and calls on countries to exchange
information on their militaries, provide notice of certain military
exercises, and host foreign military visits.
But the Article V negotiations lost their impetus after Yugoslavia
joined the OSCE last November, thereby pledging to adhere to the
Vienna Document, following the October ouster of long-time Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic. As a result, the “Concluding
Document” of the Article V process merely includes several
references encouraging countries to expand upon or enhance measures
outlined in the Vienna Document. A commission will meet at least
once a year to review implementation of the Concluding Document,
which will become effective January 1, 2002.
African States Extend Light Weapons Moratorium
A group of 15 West African states announced July 6 a three-year
extension of their moratorium on the export, import, and manufacture
of light weapons. The light weapons moratorium, agreed upon by the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), originally took
effect November 1, 1998, and the extension officially began July
5.
The moratorium, which is not legally binding and has no compliance
or monitoring mechanisms, applies to seven categories of weapons:
pistols, shotguns, submachine guns, rifles, machine guns, anti-tank
mortars, and landmines.
ECOWAS members agreed in December 1999 to a code of conduct under
the moratorium calling on states to seek a waiver to import or produce
any light weapons for purposes such as peacekeeping operations or
hunting. Members also approved establishing a prototype regional
arms register and database for collecting information on the import,
export, military holdings, seizures, and manufacture of weapons
in the seven categories, although work on the register has been
suspended because of lack of funding.
Adherence to the moratorium has been mixed, due in part to armed
conflicts in some ECOWAS member states, most notably Sierra Leone.
However, while acknowledging some “irregularities,” Ivor
Fung, the director of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace
and Disarmament in Africa, said in an August 30 interview that the
moratorium has succeeded in raising awareness of the problem of
light weapons on the continent and attracting high-level government
attention.
Pentagon Clarifies South Asia Nuclear Policy
Remarks that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made in June
were not intended to suggest that the Bush administration had shifted
away from the Clinton administration’s goal of seeking nuclear
disarmament in South Asia, the Pentagon has clarified. (See ACT,
July/August 2001.)
In a July 12 response to written questions, a Pentagon spokesman
said that, despite Rumsfeld’s comments that India and Pakistan
should be encouraged to “live with nuclear weapons and not
use them,” nuclear disarmament in South Asia remains the “long-term”
goal of the United States.
The spokesman characterized Rumsfeld’s statement as “simply
a reiteration of the reality that India and Pakistan have tested
nuclear devices.” The spokesman said the remark did not signal
a change in Washington’s “goal of seeking universal adherence
to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
The 1970 treaty recognizes only China, France, Russia, the United
States, and the United Kingdom as nuclear-weapon states. For India
and Pakistan to join, they would have to destroy their nuclear arsenals
and open their nuclear programs to international monitoring.
The Pentagon’s clarification said that, until it can achieve
nuclear disarmament in South Asia, Washington will urge India and
Pakistan to implement “concrete steps to restrain their nuclear
and missile programs and prevent a costly and destabilizing arms
race.” These steps include refraining from further nuclear
tests and the production of fissile material, restraining nuclear-capable
ballistic-missile development, and resuming the Indo-Pakistani security
dialogue.
Notably, these measures do not include urging New Delhi or Islamabad
to adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a Clinton administration
objective. The Bush administration does not support the treaty,
which bans nuclear testing and which was rejected by the Senate
in October 1999.
Bush Team Shies From Clinton Landmine Policy
In its ongoing review of U.S. landmine policy, the Bush administration
appears to be distancing itself from then-President Bill Clinton’s
statement that by 2006 the United States might sign the Ottawa Convention,
a treaty banning anti-personnel landmines (APLs).
In a July letter to Representative James McGovern (D-MA), Assistant
Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Paul Kelly wrote that
in its review, due to be completed later this year, the administration
had to “examine the need for landmines on the modern battlefields
of the future.” Kelly contended that “the United States
bears unique security burdens and cannot undercut the effectiveness
of [its] military on the way to that future.”
Kelly pointed out that the United States is already a state-party
to the amended mines protocol of the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW), which he described as “equally important”
as the Ottawa Convention.
The Ottawa Convention proscribes the use, stockpiling, production,
and transfer of APLs, whereas the CCW protocol outlaws APLs that
are not detectable but permits the use of mines if deployed in certain
ways, such as within perimeter-marked areas. Kelly wrote that the
United States believes the CCW protocol provides the “most
appropriate and responsible avenue” for balancing the need
to protect U.S. combat troops with the obligation to minimize civilian
risks.
In 1997, the United States opted against signing the Ottawa Convention
after other countries rejected U.S. proposals that would have allowed
the Pentagon to continue deploying APLs on the Korean Peninsula
and to retain specific types of anti-tank mines. The Clinton administration
later said Washington would join the treaty by 2006 if the United
States succeeded in “identifying and fielding suitable alternatives”
for its APLs and mixed anti-tank mines by that time.
In his letter, Kelly noted that since 1993 the United States has
provided more than $500 million toward supplying other countries
with de-mining training and equipment and educating people about
APL dangers. Washington will “aspire to continued leadership…to
address the humanitarian problem posed by landmines,” Kelly
wrote, “but we will do so in a way that assures our national
security.”
Israel Cancels Radar Deal With China
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon sent a letter in July
to Chinese President Jiang Zemin informing him that Israel would
not reconsider its decision to halt the sale of a sophisticated
radar system to Beijing. Israel will begin negotiations with China
in the “near future” on how to compensate China for the
cancelled contract, Israeli Ministry of Defense spokesman Shlomo
Dror said during an August 28 interview.
In July 2000, under pressure from the United States, then-Israeli
Prime Minister Ehud Barak stopped the sale of the radar system,
known as the Phalcon. Chinese acquisition of the system would have
given Beijing its first advanced airborne early-warning capability,
which the United States feared could help tip the Taiwan Strait
military balance in China’s favor.
But Barak did not actually cancel the deal. Instead, an Israeli
spokesperson said that Israel would “continue to look for ways
to implement the deal in understanding with the United States if
the circumstances…change.” The Bush administration, however,
rebuffed the idea of reversing U.S. opposition when Israeli officials
broached the issue, leading Sharon to send his letter.
Sharon’s letter expressed “regret” for having
to cancel the deal, Dror said. The spokesman added that Israel wants
to maintain good relations with China and still considers U.S. opposition
to the sale a “mistake” because it thinks Beijing will
obtain a similar capability from another supplier, such as Russia
or France, or will develop comparable technology on its own.
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act Renewed
President George W. Bush signed a bill August 3 to renew the Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act (ILSA) for five years.
Set to expire August 5, five years after it became law, ILSA seeks
to punish entities for investing in Iranian or Libyan petroleum
industries, aiming to prevent Tehran or Tripoli from gaining petroleum
profits that could be used to develop or acquire weapons of mass
destruction or to finance terrorism.
The law requires the United States to impose sanctions on foreign
companies that invest more than $20 million per year in Iranian
oil or gas development. Entities investing more than $40 million
per year in Libyan oil or gas development would also be sanctioned.
The new extension law reduces this cap on investment in Libya to
$20 million annually.
The administration had appealed for a two-year reauthorization
of the act, largely to give it flexibility as it embarks on a broad
review of U.S. sanctions policy. But Congress overwhelming approved
the five-year extension in July and did not provide a mechanism
for adjusting or reassessing the sanctions. The extension, however,
allows the administration to report to Congress on the sanction’s
effectiveness, and it retains provisions of the original law that
grant the president the right to waive sanctions.
No sanctions have ever been imposed under ILSA since it took effect
in 1996, despite major violations by French, Malaysian, Russian,
and Italian entities.
NATO Collects Weapons in Macedonia
On August 27, NATO launched a mission to collect 3,300 weapons
that ethnic Albanian rebels in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
agreed to surrender in exchange for expanded political rights. The
mission, known as Operation Essential Harvest, is expected to last
30 days.
After months of escalating conflict between Macedonian troops and
ethnic Albanian guerrillas, Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski—fearing
a civil war—requested June 14 that NATO help disarm the rebels.
NATO agreed but predicated its support on four conditions: a ceasefire;
a political agreement among Macedonia’s main political parties,
including representatives from both the majority Slav and minority
Albanian populations; a voluntary disarmament plan acceptable to
the rebels; and an agreed understanding on how NATO would conduct
its operation.
After determining that these conditions had been met, on August
22, NATO authorized the full deployment of its weapons collection
task force, numbering close to 5,000 troops. The United States did
not supply any ground forces, but it is providing medical and logistical
support.
Some estimates put the total number of rebel-owned weapons in Macedonia
at more that 80,000. However, NATO operation commander Major General
Gunnar Lange countered on August 26 that his mission’s target
of 3,300 weapons—more than 2,950 assault rifles, 210 machine
guns, and 130 mortars and anti-tank weapons—was “very
close to our own estimates” of rebel stockpiles. NATO will
not ferret out and confiscate weapons in Macedonia, only taking
those turned in voluntarily.
Lange also disputed claims that Operation Essential Harvest is
merely a gesture, saying it would be a “very real and substantial
effort to remove the combat effectiveness” of the Albanians.
Speaking August 29, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson added
that NATO troops had recently stopped some 2,000 weapons and 150,000
rounds of ammunition from being smuggled into Macedonia.
Once the rebels give up their weapons and disband, the Macedonian
parliament, in exchange, will pass reforms codifying ethnic Albanian
rights. As part of that compromise, parliament promised to begin
the reform process after NATO collected one-third of the projected
3,300 rebel weapons. NATO reached that mark on August 30
Putin Approves Spent-Fuel Import Legislation
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a controversial set of
laws July 11 allowing the import of spent nuclear fuel.
The most significant measure overrides an existing environmental
ban on the import of foreign spent fuel for storage or disposal.
(See ACT,
July/August 2001.) A second law regulates spent-fuel import
arrangements, and a third designates funds generated from imports
for cleanup of radioactively contaminated sites. The Russian legislature
approved the laws in June.
Putin also established a commission of government representatives
to oversee spent-fuel imports and submitted a bill to the lower
house of parliament that would make imports contingent on the group’s
approval.
Russia hopes to generate substantial revenue by importing, storing,
and eventually reprocessing up to 20,000 tons of foreign spent fuel,
but critics maintain that there are significant environmental and
proliferation risks in making Russia a global nuclear-waste dump.
Although demand for fuel-storage services appears high, at a July
11 press conference Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev
said that “there are so far no potential clients in view.”
Rumyantsev said Russia has begun raising the issue with foreign
officials but emphasized that “this is a very long process”
that would likely be drawn out for “several years.”
Most of the nuclear material in countries likely to be interested
in costly spent-fuel storage originally came from the United States,
and U.S. agreements with those countries give Washington veto power
over transferring the material to third parties. The United States
would therefore have to approve most spent-fuel shipments to Russia
before they could proceed.
Before giving its consent to such transfers, the administration
has emphasized that it would require Russia to meet proliferation,
safety, and environmental standards and that it would want to reach
an understanding concerning Russia’s controversial nuclear
cooperation with Iran. Given the number and magnitude of disagreements
between the two countries in these areas, it appears unlikely that
Russia will be able to begin large-scale imports soon.
Bush Waives Nuclear Sanctions Against Pakistan
On August 13, President George W. Bush granted a one-time waiver
of sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan for its nuclear activities.
The waiver allows the United States to sell spare parts for Cobra
helicopters and armored personnel carriers and ammunition to Pakistan,
which plans to use the supplies to support peacekeeping activities
in Sierra Leone.
The Arms Control Export Act and the Foreign Assistance Act, as
amended, bar direct military sales to Pakistan because of its development
and testing of nuclear weapons. Legislation passed in 1999 allows
the president to waive these sanctions indefinitely.
Then-President Bill Clinton used the 1999 waiver to allow the sale
of Sea King naval rescue helicopters to India in January, the only
other time such authority has been exercised. (See ACT,
March 2001.) Direct military sales to India were cut off after
its May 1998 nuclear tests.
Last Minuteman III Missile Silo Destroyed
On August 24, the United States destroyed its last Minuteman III
missile silo slated for dismantlement under START I. Demolition
of the silo, located at Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota,
takes Washington one step closer to meeting an upcoming treaty implementation
deadline.
The START I accord requires the United States and Russia to deploy
no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads on 1,600 strategic delivery
vehicles by December 5. To help meet this deadline, the United States
began destroying 150 Minuteman III silos in October 1999. It plans
to retain 501 of these missiles, according to an administration
official.
Washington intends to make other significant nuclear force reductions
over the next few months to meet its START commitments, the official
said. These include destroying one decommissioned Poseidon submarine
and 15 B-52 bombers configured to carry air-launched cruise missiles.
Washington will also reduce the number of warheads on each of its
192 Trident I missiles from eight to six and the number of warheads
on 150 of its remaining Minuteman III missiles from three to one.
These reductions will put the United States “well below START
limits,” with 1,238 delivery vehicles and 5,903 warheads, the
official stated.
The official added that “it certainly appears the Russians
are on track to finish on time.” Ukraine also has START-accountable
delivery vehicles on its territory and is expected to meet the December
deadline too, the official said.
START I entered into force in December 1994 and remains in effect
until 2009, unless it is extended or superseded by a new nuclear
reduction agreement. At a March 1997 summit in Helsinki, Moscow
and Washington agreed to work to make the START I and II accords
unlimited in duration but have not followed through on that commitment.
START II, which would require both sides to reduce their arsenals
to 3,500 deployed strategic warheads, has not yet entered into force.
Moscow Seeks Five-Way ‘Strategic
Stability’ Talks
During a July 1-3 summit in Russia with French President Jacques
Chirac, Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested holding multilateral
“strategic stability” talks, at which further U.S. and
Russian strategic nuclear warhead cuts could be discussed.
A Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesman clarified July 6 that
Putin was calling for “a permanently operating consulting process
on the problems of strategic stability” in which the five legally
recognized nuclear-weapon states—the United States, Russia,
the United Kingdom, China, and France—would participate.
The spokesman also said that Russia hoped the five countries would
discuss “drastic reductions” in U.S. and Russian strategic
nuclear arsenals, going down to or below 1,500 deployed strategic
warheads. The reductions would be implemented by 2008 “under
the strict control provided by the agreements START I and START
II.” Russia hopes the other three countries “also will
continue to show restraint in the nuclear field,” the spokesman
added.
By December, the United States and Russia each will have reduced
their deployed arsenals to 6,000 strategic warheads under START
I, but the diplomatic process for pursuing further cuts has stalled.
Both states have ratified START II, requiring them to cap their
arsenals at 3,500 deployed warheads, but a Russian legislative requirement
linking the accord to disputed missile defense issues has prevented
the treaty from entering into force. Also, START III negotiations,
which the two sides agreed in 1997 would cap warhead limits at 2,500
deployed warheads, have failed to start, and the Bush administration
appears reluctant to conclude a formal treaty on nuclear cuts.
With this proposal, it appears that Putin is trying to marshal
international support for both deep, negotiated reductions—which
could conceivably involve other countries once the United States
and Russia had reached extremely low levels—and maintenance
of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
When asked about the proposal during a July 13 press briefing,
national security adviser Condoleezza Rice said that President George
W. Bush is already considering unilaterally reducing U.S. nuclear
weapons and that the administration is not interested in seeking
a “one-to-one match with the Russians.” Moscow and Washington
subsequently agreed to and have held bilateral consultations on
offensive reductions and defensive systems. (See U.S.-Russian
Differences Remain On Missile Defenses, ABM Treaty.)
North Korea Refuses to Resume Talks With
U.S.
North Korea has continued to reject U.S. offers to resume bilateral
discussions, which could include nuclear, missile, and conventional
weapons issues.
At a July 26 press conference in Hanoi, Secretary of State Colin
Powell stressed a willingness to resume discussions quickly with
North Korea on the “broad agenda” laid out by President
George W. Bush in June. At that time, Bush controversially called
for bilateral talks that would link progress on nuclear and missile
issues to a “less threatening” North Korean conventional
military presence on the Korean Peninsula. Powell emphasized a U.S.
willingness to “meet any time and any place” to “talk
about anything.”
Despite this and other U.S. invitations to the negotiating table,
Pyongyang has not engaged Washington. In a rare interview, published
July 26 by the Russian Itar-Tass news agency, North Korean leader
Kim Jong-Il said that the Bush administration is “committed
to a policy of isolation and suppression of North Korea.” Kim,
who was about to embark on a state trip to Russia, also bristled
at Washington’s desire to discuss North Korea’s conventional
weapons, saying Bush had issued “a new impudent challenge”
by raising the issue.
In spite of these remarks, during an August 4 meeting in Moscow
with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kim reportedly reaffirmed
a May 2001 pledge to maintain a moratorium on ballistic missile
flight tests until at least 2003.
U.S.-North Korean relations have soured since March, when Bush
placed missile negotiations with North Korea on hold, pending the
outcome of a policy review, and said he was “skeptical”
of Kim. The president also questioned whether Pyongyang was abiding
by all of its international agreements.
In an August 11 interview with South Korea’s Chungang Ilbo
during a trip to Asia, Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee, said that Bush had privately expressed
regret for the way his administration had initially handled policy
toward Pyongyang. Biden said that, after a meeting with the president,
he felt Bush “was clearly aware” that his March comments
about Kim were “a blunder” and that the president never
intended to disrupt relations.
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