NEWS BRIEFS

Russia Reduces Strategic Rocket Forces’ Stature

Ukraine Eliminates Last of Its Strategic Bombers

Iraqi Radiological Weapons Program Detailed

CD Reconvenes, Stalemate Likely to Continue

UN Lifts Arms Embargo on Ethiopia, Eritrea

Officials Mark End of INF Treaty Inspections

Officials representing the United States, Russia, and three other former Soviet republics gathered in Moscow on May 21 to commemorate the end of inspections under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Inspections under the U.S.-Soviet-negotiated agreement are due to wrap up May 31, exactly 13 years after the landmark treaty entered into force.

The INF Treaty, signed in December 1987 by President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, prohibits the development, production, and deployment of all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. In order to enforce the agreement’s stringent provisions, unprecedented verification measures were negotiated, including both on-site inspections and continuous monitoring at designated facilities.

The United States and Russia maintained inspectors at each other’s missile assembly plants in order to ensure that missiles were not being constructed in violation of the treaty’s terms. The Russian inspectors are due to depart the U.S. facility in Magna, Utah, at the end of May, while a U.S. inspection team will remain at the Russian missile facility in Votkinsk to conduct monitoring allowed under START. Russia has not exercised its option to conduct continuous monitoring under START.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States informed the 12 newly independent former Soviet states that it considered them bound by the provisions of the INF Treaty. Four of those states—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—have participated regularly in the Special Verification Commission, a forum for INF Treaty-related discussion and negotiation.

Marking the end of inspections, representatives from the four post-Soviet participants and the United States signed a formal declaration, which states, “The experience accumulated in the course of inspection activities under the INF Treaty will undoubtedly be used in future bilateral and multilateral negotiations on arms control and disarmament.”

Russia Reduces Strategic Rocket Forces’ Stature

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov appointed a new head of the Strategic Rocket Forces April 27, emphasizing the position’s reduced status in the military command hierarchy.

Ivanov named Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov to replace Vladimir Yakovlev at the helm of Russia’s land-based strategic nuclear forces. Yakovlev had held the position as commander-in-chief since 1997, but in announcing the new appointment, Ivanov said, “I emphasize that Solovtsov has been appointed commander, not commander-in-chief,” indicating that the rocket forces will likely lose their independent status.

The Strategic Rocket Forces have traditionally operated as a separate branch of the military, much like the army, navy, and air force. They will now likely be subordinated to the air force, although Russian officials have yet to announce that specific change.

Last year, Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin and then-Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev publicly clashed over the future of Russia’s nuclear forces, with Kvashnin arguing that funds should be shifted to meet conventional needs and Sergeyev, Yakovlev’s predecessor at the rocket forces, arguing for the pre-eminence of nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine. (See ACT, September 2000.) President Vladimir Putin appeared to side with Kvashnin last summer, and Sergeyev was replaced as defense minister in March.

Since assuming his position March 28, Ivanov has argued for a “balanced approach” to military funding, recognizing the importance of nuclear forces but also noting that conventional forces have been “a little neglected,” according to March 31 interview published by Russian news agency Interfax.

Ukraine Eliminates Last of Its Strategic Bombers

Ukraine dismantled its last strategic bomber during a May 17 ceremony at an airfield in Uzin attended by senior U.S. and Ukrainian officials, almost two months after Kiev eliminated its final strategic air-launched cruise missile.

Ukraine must finish eliminating its strategic arms by the START I implementation deadline of December 5, 2001. To date, Kiev has destroyed 11 Tu-160 strategic bombers, 27 strategic Tu-95 bombers, and 483 Kh-55 air-launched cruise missiles. Another 11 heavy bombers and 582 strategic cruise missiles were transferred to Russia under a 1999 agreement as payment for natural gas debts. In addition, all of Ukraine’s 130 SS-19 ICBMs and associated silos and launch-control centers have been eliminated, as have 32 SS-24 ICBMs and their associated infrastructure.

Although all of Ukraine’s ICBMs have been removed from their launch tubes and have been destroyed, Kiev must still eliminate 14 SS-24 silos and three launch-control centers. Work to restore the sites fully is expected to continue until mid-2002.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine agreed to rid itself of the nuclear weapons left on its soil by joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state and by becoming a START I party. In June 1996, Kiev announced that the last of its estimated 3,000 tactical and 2,000 strategic nuclear warheads had been transferred to Russia.

Since 1997, under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the United States has assisted Ukraine with dismantling remaining heavy bombers, strategic air-launched cruise missiles, and ICBMs and associated silos and launch-control centers.

The CTR program will also help Ukraine eliminate its Tu-22M Backfire bombers, Tu-134 combat trainers, and Kh-22 air-launched cruise missiles. According to Defense Threat Reduction Agency spokesman Bob Bennett, although these weapons systems are not covered by the START agreement, given their capabilities, the United States feels it is “advantageous” to assist Ukraine with their dismantlement. CTR efforts in Ukraine are expected to be concluded by 2007.

Iraqi Radiological Weapons Program Detailed

An Iraqi government report detailing Baghdad’s efforts to build a radiological weapon was made public at the end of April by the private Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. A radiological weapon does not involve a nuclear explosion but simply dispenses radioactive isotopes with conventional explosives.

Although the existence of Iraq’s radiological weapons program has been recognized for some time, the 1987 Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency report, which was turned over to the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) after the Persian Gulf War, provides details of Baghdad’s attempt to build and test a radiological weapon that were not previously available to the public. The Wisconsin Project obtained the report from an unnamed UN source and gave it to The New York Times, which reported on its contents April 29.

Iraq developed and reportedly tested a radiological bomb in late 1987 to achieve a means of “area denial” during the final stages of the Iran-Iraq War. According to a December 1995 UNSCOM report—and confirmed by the leaked document—Iraqi scientists tested three prototype weapons. UNSCOM reported that the Iraqis characterized the test results as “disappointing” because most of the radioactive material did not disperse in a militarily useful way. Iraq told UNSCOM that the program had been “shelved” in mid-1988.

The Iraqi ambassador to the UN, Mohammed Al-Douri, responded to the leaked document in a May 5 letter addressed to the UN secretary-general. Although admitting that “Iraqi specialists explored the technical and practical aspects” of a radiological device, “they ascertained that it was not feasible.” However, the letter directly refuted the charges in both the UNSCOM report and the Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency document that the device was ever constructed or tested, noting that “the idea died, and no radiological bombs were manufactured and none were tested.”

Shortly before the Gulf War began in January 1991, the National Intelligence Council, in response to newspaper reports, concluded that while it would be feasible for the Iraqis “to build a functioning radiological weapon,” it would not be militarily significant: “It would create no special blast effect, and it could not cause widespread radiation sickness.”

CD Reconvenes, Stalemate Likely to Continue

The UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) started the second third of its 2001 negotiating session on May 17. The 66 members of the conference are trying to find consensus on a work program, which would enable the delegations to begin negotiations for the first time in nearly three years. That consensus, however, is proving elusive.

China and Russia are continuing to lead the charge for formal negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, an effort the United States staunchly opposes. Washington, which says it is more than happy to hold less formal discussions on outer space but no more, wants immediate negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty. But Moscow and Beijing tie negotiations on a fissile cutoff with negotiations on outer space. None of the three powers shows any sign of giving ground.

Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, who just completed his rotation as conference president, said May 23 that his recent consultations with more than 40 delegations revealed a “deep concern” about the conference’s inactivity. Delegations have until June 29 to pass a work program before this current portion of the 2001 negotiating session ends. The third and final working part of the session is scheduled to take place from July 30 to September 14.

UN Lifts Arms Embargo on Ethiopia, Eritrea

Noting that Ethiopia and Eritrea had reached a peace settlement, the UN Security Council did not extend a one-year arms embargo on the African neighbors beyond a May 16 expiration date but warned that it would take action if conflict resumed in the region.

On May 17, 2000, the Security Council passed Resolution 1298, which banned all states from selling or supplying Ethiopia and Eritrea with arms and munitions and from providing both sides with arms-related training and assistance for one year. Under the resolution, the Security Council could reinstate the year-long arms embargo if Ethiopia and Eritrea did not stop fighting and resume peace negotiations. (See ACT, June 2000.)

The Security Council imposed the measures just days after war renewed between the two states, which had been fighting intermittently since a May 1998 border dispute. On June 18, 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed to a ceasefire and, following talks, signed a peace agreement in Algeria on December 12.

With sanctions lifted, states could renew or make new arms deals with Ethiopia and Eritrea, and several states with previous weapons contracts in the region stand to benefit from the expired embargo. According to data submitted to the 1998 UN Register of Conventional Arms, Russia has delivered heavy artillery to Ethiopia and combat aircraft to Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Bulgaria and Belarus have supplied Ethiopia with battle tanks. In recent years, China, Israel, North Korea, Romania, and Ukraine have also been identified as arms suppliers to both African countries.

On May 9, the sanctions committee established under Resolution 1298 to monitor the arms embargo asked Ukraine, along with Eritrea and four other countries, to investigate reports that a Ukrainian aircraft, carrying 30 tons of rifles and ammunition allegedly en route to Eritrea, violated the embargo in April. The plane originated in the Czech Republic and was officially destined for Georgia but was seized during a refueling stop in Bulgaria after its pilot reportedly requested permission to take off for Eritrea. After the 30-day investigation period, the sanctions committee can decide whether to react.