Home   About ACA Become A Member Subscribe To ACT Employment (3) Internships Contact Us
Search 
Arms Control Today
Current Issue
Archived Issues
Subscribe
Submissions & Letters
Advertising
Permission/Reprint Requests
Subject Resources
Country Resources
Fact Sheets
Treaties
ACA Events
Press Room
Interviews
Projects & Reports
Book Reviews
Arms Control in Print
Links

Contribute to ACA in 2008!

Register for Arms Control Association e-mail updates
Email:

Arms Control Today March 2001

News Briefs

Ukraine Ratifies ABM Succession MOU

India Tests Agni-2 Ballistic Missile

IAEA Inspects Iraqi Nuclear Materials

Navy Theater Wide Flight Test Succeeds

Bush Orders Strategic Policy Review

Joint U.S.-Russian TMD Exercise Conducted

Russia Ships Nuclear Fuel to India

Clinton Urges Bush to Sign Ottawa Convention

U.S., U.K. Issue Statement on Export Controls

F-22 Raptor Sale to Israel Supported by Clinton

India, Russia Finalize Battle Tank Contract

Clinton Allows Helicopter-Parts Transfer to India

Russia Holds Second GCS Conference

UN Arms Embargo Against Taliban Takes Effect


Ukraine Ratifies ABM Succession MOU

On January 30, Ukraine ratified a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that designates Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine as the successor states to the Soviet Union for the purposes of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The four former Soviet republics and the United States must approve the 1997 MOU before it and several related agreements signed at the same time can enter into force.

The related agreements include two statements that demarcate the technical boundaries between theater missile defenses, which are not banned by the ABM Treaty, and strategic missile defenses, which are limited by the treaty. The package also includes an agreement on confidence-building measures that calls for annual exchanges of information and notification of theater missile defense tests.

The Ukrainian parliament approved the agreement by a vote of 294-1 on January 11 and President Leonid Kuchma signed legislation ratifying it 19 days later, according to a U.S. official. Russia approved the MOU last spring, but Belarus and Kazakhstan have yet to do so, and prospects for U.S. ratification appear slim.

In the absence of the MOU's entry into force, the U.S. government has accepted Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union for the purposes of the treaty. Nevertheless, a number of senators maintain the ABM Treaty was invalidated with the Soviet Union's 1991 collapse.


India Tests Agni-2 Ballistic Missile

India conducted its second flight test of the Agni-2 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) on January 17. In a statement released shortly after the launch, the Indian Defense Ministry noted that the missile was tested in its "final operational configuration" and that "mission objectives were met satisfactorily."

The road-mobile, two-stage, solid-fueled Agni-2 is New Delhi's most advanced missile system. It can deliver a 1,000-kilogram payload more than 2,000 kilometers, reaching targets throughout Pakistan and much of western China and Southeast Asia. The Indian defense minister's scientific adviser, V.K. Aatre, told reporters January 25 that the nuclear-capable missile will be inducted into the Indian arsenal sometime this year.

India tested the IRBM at the Interim Test Range at Chandipur, in the eastern state of Orissa. According to the Indian Foreign Ministry, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Pakistan, and Japan were notified in advance of the impending test in accordance with an agreement signed in Lahore in 1999.

India first tested the Agni-2 in April 1999, approximately one year after its 1998 nuclear tests. At that time, Pakistan responded quickly with missile tests of its own.

This year, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry reacted with a statement characterizing India's nuclear and missile programs as "ambitious" and saying they posed "a direct threat to Pakistan's security." The ministry also reiterated Islamabad's October 1998 proposal to develop a "Strategic Restraint Regime to promote nuclear and conventional stabilization and to strengthen peace and stability in South Asia."


IAEA Inspects Iraqi Nuclear Materials

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted an inspection of Iraqi nuclear materials January 20-23, successfully verifying "the presence" of non-weapons-grade fissile materials under IAEA safeguards, according to Mohamed ElBaradei, the agency's director-general. ElBaradei's comments, made in a February 12 letter to the UN Security Council, added that Iraq had provided the inspectors with the "necessary cooperation" and access required to perform their mission "effectively and efficiently."

The inspection, known as a physical inventory verification (PIV), sought to ensure that Iraq's known remaining nuclear material—which is non-weapons-grade and all located near Baghdad at the Tuwaitha C storage facility—was accounted for and properly safeguarded. As a member of the IAEA and nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iraq is required not to divert to weapons purposes any of the 1.8 tons of low-enriched uranium or several tons of natural and depleted uranium held at the storage facility.

PIV inspections are not conducted under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 687, which was passed after the Persian Gulf War and required Iraq to give up its weapons of mass destruction. Under the resolution, the IAEA carried out full-scale monitoring and inspection activities and removed "weapons-relevant" nuclear materials from Iraq. PIVs are conducted under the agency's 1972 safeguards agreement with Baghdad, which requires inspections at declared nuclear facilities at least every 14 months. The last PIV was conducted in January 2000.

Due to its limited scope, a PIV cannot verify that Iraq has not been attempting to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. According to the IAEA, it will only be able to give such an assurance when it resumes the activities established under Resolution 687, which were suspended in December 1998 just before U.S.-British airstrikes against Iraq.


Navy Theater Wide Flight Test Succeeds

Repeating the same mission of a failed July 14 test last year, the Navy conducted a successful flight test of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) January 25, achieving separation between the missile's second- and third-stage boosters for the first time. (See ACT, September 2000.) Part of the Navy Theater Wide ballistic missile defense program, the SM-3 is intended to boost a kinetic (non-explosive) warhead into space from U.S. Aegis-equipped naval ships to destroy an incoming medium- or long-range theater ballistic missile warhead by colliding with it. The test marked only the third flight of the SM-3.

Delayed by more than a month because of software problems in the SM-3 navigational system, the most recent test demonstrated the missile's "airframe stability and control" up through the warhead's separation from the booster, according to a January 26 Pentagon press release. Although the SM-3 carried a kinetic warhead and the test involved a target, no intercept was planned or attempted; the warhead's mechanism enabling it to maneuver toward a target was deliberatively left inactive. A Navy spokesman explained that once the warhead separated from the third stage the "mission objectives were complete" and the kinetic warhead simply "tumbled after separation."

During the next flight test, planned for this summer, the kinetic warhead will be fully functional and is expected to acquire, track, and maneuver toward a mock warhead, though an intercept is not a test objective. The first official intercept attempt will not be until this fall. The Navy does not yet have an exact date for initial deployment of the system, but that objective is expected to be determined later this year.


Bush Orders Strategic Policy Review

President George W. Bush has issued a directive to the Pentagon to initiate a review of U.S. strategic policy, according to administration officials. The classified directive, dated February 15, calls for an assessment of the proper balance and role of offensive nuclear forces and defensive capabilities. The administration expects the review to be completed by mid-summer.

Administration officials have declined to specify whether the upcoming review is the strategic posture review ordered by Congress this past fall. In the fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress called for the Pentagon to conduct a nuclear posture review "concurrently" with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a thorough Pentagon assessment of U.S. military policy to be carried out every four years. (See ACT, November 2000.)

The strategic review is part of a larger "top to bottom" review Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has pledged to undertake, which also includes a review of conventional force structure and a review of personnel issues. When queried about the scope of the "top to bottom" review and its relationship to the QDR at a January 30 briefing, Defense Department spokesman Rear Admiral Craig Quigley stated that Rumsfeld "just has not finalized his thinking on that."

The Clinton administration conducted a nuclear posture review in 1994 that largely reaffirmed existing policy. The administration also issued a presidential decision directive in 1997 that significantly modified U.S. nuclear doctrine, abandoning a Reagan-era requirement to be able to fight and win a protracted nuclear war.

The new review's outcome appears central to the Bush administration's implementation of campaign promises on unilaterally reducing U.S. nuclear forces and deploying a missile defense. On January 26, Bush pledged to "go forward" with missile defense and to fulfill his campaign promise on nuclear forces "commensurate with our ability to keep the peace."


Joint U.S.-Russian TMD Exercise Conducted

On February 11, the United States and Russia concluded a 10-day joint theater missile defense (TMD) exercise at the Joint National Test Facility in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The exercise was the first phase of a two-part exercise aimed at improving the capability of U.S. and Russian forces to operate together to protect against short- and medium-range ballistic missile attacks in the event the two forces are deployed together and face a common adversary.

The principal focus of the exercise was establishing and refining common procedures for the two sides to "communicate and cooperate" with one another, a Defense Department spokesperson said. The exercise was computer simulated and the two forces were given generic TMD capabilities with the same performance parameters, minimizing the danger that any sensitive information could be compromised. According to the Pentagon spokesperson, approximately 80 Americans and 32 Russians participated in the exercise, which cost $735,000.

The United States and Russia have held two other joint TMD exercises. Initiated by then-Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin in September 1994, the first of the exercises took place in Colorado in 1996, and the second occurred in Moscow in 1998.

The second part of this latest exercise is scheduled to take place next year from January 23 to February 3 in Fort Bliss, Texas, where U.S. and Russian teams will be tasked with responding to simulated ballistic missile attacks by using the procedures worked out during the first phase. The spokesperson described this second phase as "limited field testing."


Russia Ships Nuclear Fuel to India

In apparent violation of its non-proliferation commitments, Russia followed through in February with a deal to ship low-enriched uranium to India's nuclear power station at Tarapur. The Tarapur site, located in the state of Maharashtra, contains two U.S.-built 160-megawatt light-water reactors that the United States supplied with fuel until 1980.

The deal, which was reportedly made in August, has raised objections from Washington. A February 16 statement by State Department spokesman Philip Reeker expressed deep "regret" over Russia's "violation" of its commitments as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The group, a 39-nation regime of nuclear supplier states, has undertaken not to transfer nuclear materials or technology to non-nuclear-weapon states without International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at all their nuclear sites. While the Tarapur reactors have been under IAEA safeguards since 1994, other Indian nuclear sites are not safeguarded.

Under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, India is considered a non-nuclear-weapon state, despite its nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998.

Reeker added that at a December NSG meeting the "overwhelming majority" of members expressed their "strong concerns" about the then-pending transfer, which "they regarded as inconsistent with Russia's commitments." He said that Washington joins "other nuclear suppliers in calling on Russia to cancel this supply arrangement and live up to its non-proliferation obligations." Reeker further said that Russia's transfer of "sensitive technologies to other countries" would be an "important item" on the Bush administration's agenda.

Moscow claims that it is not violating its NSG commitments, contending it is supplying the fuel for the reactors' "safe operation." NSG guidelines do permit nuclear material transfers to non-nuclear-weapon states without all their facilities safeguarded if the shipment is essential for safety purposes.


Clinton Urges Bush to Sign Ottawa Convention

On his last full day as commander-in-chief, President Bill Clinton urged the incoming Bush administration to "take the steps necessary" to enable the United States to eventually join the Ottawa Convention, which bans anti-personnel landmines (APLs). At the same time, Clinton deferred a decision on the future of two controversial Pentagon APL alternatives, leaving it up to the incoming Bush administration to choose whether to proceed with or cut the programs. The new administration has yet to speak on landmines.

Though Clinton endorsed the eventual elimination of APLs early in his presidency—making a September 1994 speech to the UN General Assembly calling for negotiation of a multilateral landmine control regime—the United States subsequently refused to sign the Ottawa Convention. Five months after the accord opened for signature in December 1997, Clinton pledged the United States would sign the treaty by 2006 if the Pentagon could identify and field suitable alternatives to APLs and mixed anti-tank systems by that time.

To date, the Defense Department has spent roughly $150 million on the APL alternative search and has two programs—the Remote Area Denial Artillery Munition (RADAM) and a "Man-in-the-Loop" system—awaiting executive decisions on whether production and development should be started. The Pentagon, however, acknowledges RADAM would not "technically comply" with the Ottawa Convention. Moreover, the "Man-in-the-Loop" system, which is a mine triggered by remote control and thereby permitted under the treaty, can be modified so that it is target activated, making it not compliant with the treaty. Convention prohibitions apply to APLs that are exploded by the "presence, proximity or contact of a person."

Clinton's deferral effectively put these two programs on hold. A Pentagon spokesman, indicated February 12 that "with the exception of these two programs, [the Department of Defense] is continuing its search for suitable alternatives."

Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), a leading proponent of banning landmines, welcomed Clinton's statement and said he looked forward to working with the Pentagon to "finish the job we have begun."


U.S., U.K. Issue Statement on Export Controls

Washington and London issued a joint statement on defense export controls January 17, marking progress in negotiations on revising British export controls to better mirror U.S. controls. In return for the revisions, the United States is expected to exempt from U.S. export licensing requirements select British companies that are seeking unclassified arms and technology.

According to the joint statement, the two governments have "reached substantial agreement in principle." However, two key issues remain unresolved: U.S. efforts to have the United Kingdom place controls on dual-use equipment and technology transfers that are not currently controlled by the European Union, of which Britain is a member, and U.S. demands that London not re-export U.S.-origin arms and technology without its consent.

While not formally suspended, the negotiations are on hold until the Bush administration completes its staffing of the State Department, which is leading the U.S. side in the talks.

The negotiations flow from the May 2000 Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI), initiated by the Pentagon to "reform" what it contends is an inefficient arms export control system. DTSI is comprised of 17 initiatives aimed at speeding up and easing the U.S. export control process for close U.S. allies. When unveiled, the Clinton administration contended DTSI would enhance interoperability between U.S. and allied militaries, reduce the disparity between U.S. and allied military capabilities, foster increased allied defense cooperation, and allow Pentagon license reviewers to devote greater attention to higher-risk export requests.

However, a General Accounting Office (GAO) report released last fall alleged that, when formulating the 17 initiatives, the Pentagon "largely relied on incomplete data and did not perform the analysis necessary to determine the underlying causes for problems it identified." GAO charged that the Pentagon based some initiatives on anecdotal evidence provided by foreign governments and U.S. industry without validating their claims, and it concluded that it was "unclear" whether the initiatives would achieve their stated objectives. The Pentagon disagreed, responding in an August 16 letter to a preview copy of the report that the initiatives were based on "extensive analysis of many of the problems" and "broad analysis of the pertinent circumstances."


F-22 Raptor Sale to Israel Supported by Clinton

In an open letter to the Israeli people sent January 19, departing President Bill Clinton wrote he would support the future sale of the F-22 Raptor combat aircraft to Israel, pledging that he would recommend that Israel be "among the first, if not the first, foreign customer." Clinton's pledge, however, is not binding on President George W. Bush and is largely perceived as a symbolic gesture underscoring the U.S. commitment to maintain Israel's "qualitative" military edge in the Middle East.

Still in the development stage, the F-22 is slated to replace the F-15 as the next U.S. air superiority fighter, but the fighter's high cost, estimated at least $180 million per plane, has raised doubts whether the United States will even procure the stealth fighter. Air Force plans call for purchasing a total of 341 Raptors, but the new Bush administration has effectively put all major acquisition programs on hold until the new secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, completes a "top to bottom" review of the U.S. military, which is expected to take months. Nevertheless, an Israeli official welcomed the Clinton letter as a "positive statement."

The outgoing Clinton administration also signed a memorandum of understanding with Israel on January 19 spelling out the unofficial U.S. policy since 1998 of phasing out U.S. economic assistance to Israel by $120 million per year until it is eliminated in 2008. In exchange, the United States has been increasing its military aid to Israel by $60 million per year until it reaches $2.4 billion annually by 2008. Previously, U.S. annual aid to Israel consisted of $1.2 billion in economic assistance and $1.8 billion in military assistance. Like the F-22 pledge, the memorandum is not binding on Bush.

In January 2000, Israel signed a $2.5 billion contract for 50 F-16C/D fighters, with deliveries to begin in 2003. The contract also included an option to buy another 60 fighters for an additional $2 billion, which Israel is currently evaluating. At this time, Israel's air force flies approximately 250 F-16 and 100 F-15 combat aircraft received from the United States.


India, Russia Finalize Battle Tank Contract

Russia and India concluded a contract for 310 T-90 battle tanks February 15 in New Delhi, finalizing an agreement initially set for signing last fall. Under the terms of the deal, India will receive 124 of Russia's top-of-the-line tanks directly from Moscow and assemble another 186 at a domestic plant. The final price tag, not publicly revealed, is estimated at between $600 million and $750 million.

Russian President Vladimir Putin was scheduled to sign the contract last October during his first visit to India, but last-minute haggling over the price and initial payment delayed the deal, which India claims will offset Pakistan's 1996 purchase of 320 T-80UD tanks from Ukraine. Russia lowered its price over the past few months, enabling Russian Deputy Premier Ilya Klebanov and Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes to sign the contract. The two officials reportedly discussed further arms deals, including the possible lease of four Tu-22M Backfire bombers to India.

Completion of the tank deal removed one more item from a list of pending arms buys left outstanding from last October. On December 28 last year, the two countries signed an estimated $3 billion agreement—preliminarily approved in October—for Indian manufacture of 140 Su-30MKI fighter aircraft under licensed production from Russia. Still awaiting final resolution is India's expected acquisition of the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov and possibly MiG-29K fighters to outfit it.

Russia is also reportedly selling India, as well as North Korea, portable anti-aircraft missile systems. Russia and the 32 other countries of the Wassenaar Arrangement pledged last December to abide by strict, though not legally binding, guidelines for exporting such weapons. (See ACT, January/February 2001.) A U.S. government official said Washington is "engaging" Russia on the purported sales.


Clinton Allows Helicopter-Parts Transfer to India

On January 19, President Bill Clinton authorized a one-time waiver of sanctions to permit New Delhi a limited number of spare parts for some of its Sea King naval helicopters. U.S. government officials stressed that the waiver only applied to specific parts already in the supply pipeline and did not constitute a blanket waiver for future transfers.

Manufactured in the United Kingdom by Westland Helicopters, India's Sea Kings were built under license from Sikorsky, a U.S. helicopter company, and incorporate U.S.-origin parts. After India conducted five nuclear tests, the United States, as mandated under the Arms Export Control Act, imposed comprehensive sanctions on India. The sanctions, which barred the sale of defense articles and services, froze work being done in the United Kingdom to service some of the Indian helicopters.

Indian government officials and press have claimed that roughly 60 percent of the Sea King fleet is grounded and that the operations of flyable aircraft are severely limited. India has purchased a total of 42 Sea Kings, which perform anti-submarine and search and rescue operations. Clinton's waiver covers some 200 individual components, according to a Westland Helicopters spokesman, who noted the action will enable only a "handful" of India's helicopters to resume activity.

New Delhi had lobbied the United States to lift the sanctions. By some accounts, India enlisted British support by suggesting that it would be more likely to conclude negotiations for the purchase of as many as 66 British Hawk trainer aircraft if London would talk to Washington on its behalf. Recent news reports suggest India may close the Hawk deal by April. None of the three governments would comment.

A State Department official, however, confirmed that an incident in which a U.S. sailor was emergency air lifted by an Indian Sea King helicopter to a hospital to receive urgent medical attention factored in the Clinton decision. The official emphasized that the Sea King's capability to perform search and rescue missions in general was an important consideration.


Russia Holds Second GCS Conference

Continuing to build upon a concept it proposed in June 1999, on February 15 Moscow hosted the second conference on its Global Control System (GCS) initiative to combat missile proliferation. Governments from over 70 countries sent high-level representatives, including China, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan—all states of missile proliferation concern. The United States was the only member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an arrangement among 32 countries aiming to stem missile proliferation, that declined to send a representative.

At the first GCS conference in March 2000, Russia outlined the framework for a multilateral regime consisting primarily of an international missile prelaunch notification agreement, a system of incentives for "stimulating and encouraging" states to forgo the possession of missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and an international forum devoted to continually addressing missile non-proliferation issues.

According to an official familiar with the discussions, at this year's conference GCS participants discussed an international code of conduct on ballistic missile non-proliferation that was first aired at MTCR meetings last year. Unlike the MTCR's restrictions on missile suppliers, the proposed code would tackle ballistic missile non-proliferation from the demand side, placing limitations on states seeking to advance their missile capabilities. Details on the code are not yet public.

According to the official, India and China—both states outside the MTCR regime—seemed willing to consider such a code of conduct, but only under the auspices of the United Nations.

While not attending the conference, Washington agreed last September, in a joint statement with Moscow, to work "on a new mechanism" to integrate the Russian GCS proposal, the missile code of conduct, and the MTCR's existing framework. (See ACT, October 2000.) A U.S. official said that Washington does not support elements of the GCS proposal outside the context of the MTCR.

While the method for building on this year's meeting remains unclear, a Russian Foreign Ministry statement said that the conference's participants suggested "a gradual practical elaboration" of the GCS, which may include bringing the proposal to the UN.


UN Arms Embargo Against Taliban Takes Effect

The UN Security Council enacted an arms embargo January 19 against the Taliban for its failure to comply with a resolution demanding that the Afghan faction turn over terrorist-suspect Osama bin Laden to a country where he has been indicted. (See ACT, January/February 2001.)

Security Council Resolution 1333, passed December 19, prohibits states from selling and supplying arms-related material, as well as military advice and training, to Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan. Additional sanctions include closing Taliban offices abroad, restricting Taliban officials' international travel, and banning flights to and from territories under Taliban control (excepting humanitarian assistance-related flights).

Under the resolution, the Taliban had one month to close terrorist training camps it sponsors and to turn over bin Laden, who allegedly resides in Afghanistan and was indicted in the United States for the 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The sanctions will remain in effect for one year or until the Taliban complies with the resolution.