NEWS BRIEFS

Shalikashvili to Lead Administration Test Ban Effort

Civil Reactors to Replenish U.S. Tritium Supply

EU Not to Renew Arms Embargo on Indonesia

Colombia to Receive 63 Helicopters in U.S. Aid

U.S., North Korea Resume Bilateral Talks

Russia Reaffirms Nuclear Aid Commitment to Iran

U.S. officials have expressed concern that civilian nuclear cooperation with Russia could aid Iran's efforts to clandestinely develop a military nuclear capability. Russia maintains that the projects pose no threat, citing Iran's compliance with IAEA safeguards as a state-party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States secured agreement in 1995 from then-President Boris Yeltsin to abandon any militarily useful nuclear cooperation with Iran, specifically the transfer of a centrifuge enrichment plant originally guaranteed in the 1995 Bushehr protocol with Tehran.

Shortly following the Russian announcement, The New York Times reported that CIA Director George Tenet had briefed administration officials on a change in the agency's assessment of the advancement of Iran's nuclear weapons. Sources cited in the January 17 Times article stated that the change acknowledged an inability to confidently track Iranian clandestine acquisition of nuclear material and technology. As a result, the CIA can no longer rule out the possibility that Iran has acquired nuclear weapons, the report said.

Concern about the pace of Iran's nuclear program is not new. In his annual threat assessment before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 1999, Tenet urged vigilance "against the possibility of a proliferation surprise" in Iran. U.S. intelligence estimates, including the 1998 report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (the "Rumsfeld Report"), have projected a 10-year timeline for the indigenous production of adequate fissile material stocks for a few weapons should Iran abandon IAEA safeguards. However, acquisition of such material from outside sources could substantially speed the weaponization process.

Shalikashvili to Lead Administration Test Ban Effort

Following the State of the Union address, in which President Clinton called for "a constructive bipartisan dialogue to work to build a consensus which...will eventually lead to the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced January 28 that retired General John Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will spearhead administration efforts to build domestic support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Shalikashvili will work with key senators to address concerns regarding the CTBT and will also make recommendations directly to the president and the secretary of state. An administration-appointed task force, whose creation was announced November 10 but whose composition and objectives still remain unclear, will support Shalikashvili's efforts.

In a January 28 briefing, State Department spokesman James Rubin said that President Clinton would not seek Senate ratification before the end of his term but that the administration hoped Shalikashvili's appointment would lay the foundation for Senate approval "in the near future." Rubin explained, "We think pursuing this effort is important for its own sake to develop support for ratification. An additional benefit we see is that other countries hopefully will regard this effort as a signal that the United States does intend eventually to ratify the CTBT...."

Civil Reactors to Replenish U.S. Tritium Supply

In a departure from the long-standing U.S. tradition of separating civilian and military nuclear reactors, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson announced December 22 that the Department of Energy (DOE) had reached an agreement with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to produce tritium for U.S. nuclear weapons in TVA's civilian light-water reactors at the Watts Bar nuclear plant near Knoxville. Production is currently scheduled to begin in 2003.

Tritium, which the United States has not produced since 1988, is a radioactive gas used to boost the yield of nuclear weapons. The United States currently maintains a five-year reserve supply of tritium-a store based on the time required to restart production at former tritium-producing reactors that were shut down because of safety concerns-but supplies are decaying. Using TVA's reactors would allow the United States to reduce its reserve to a two-year supply, since TVA's reactors need only two years to begin tritium production.

If the United States maintains its current nuclear arsenal under START I, reserve nuclear warheads and a sizable tritium reserve, it will need a new source of tritium by 2005. If the United States further reduces its arsenal to the warhead ceiling allowed under START II while maintaining a reserve sufficient to return to START I levels, it will not need a new tritium supply until 2011.

DOE has pursued and continues to fund several other options for tritium production, including construction of a particle accelerator or a new light-water reactor, or completion of a light-water reactor already under construction in Bellefonte, Alabama. DOE chose to use TVA's reactors primarily because of the low cost, but the department continues to fund alternatives in case the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which is scheduled to complete a review of the TVA option by next summer, fails to approve the use of TVA reactors.

Producing tritium in civilian power reactors could have unintended consequences for U.S. arms control and non-proliferation efforts, potentially undercutting the policy of encouraging other states to not use civil reactors for military purposes.

EU Not to Renew Arms Embargo on Indonesia

Citing "historic changes of the last few months in Indonesia," the European Union (EU) announced on January 17 that it would not continue its arms embargo and suspension of bilateral military ties with the island nation. An extension of the prohibitions-imposed on September 16 in response to the violence sweeping East Timor-past the set expiration date of January 17 would have required unanimity among the 15 EU members. Reportedly, a majority of countries favored not extending the embargo. The EU noted, however, that future arms exports to Indonesia would be governed by the 1998 EU code of conduct on arms exports, which lists eight non-binding criteria that members are to consider before making arms deals.

The EU announcement came three days after Richard Holbrooke, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, warned the Indonesian military against carrying out a coup. Washington's September 9 suspension of all arms deliveries and military cooperation with Indonesia remains in effect. In the fiscal year 2000 foreign operations appropriations bill, Congress mandated that the president report that six conditions (including the return of refugees and the trial of militia and armed forces members accused of human rights violations) have been met before foreign military financing and international military education and training programs with Jakarta may be resumed.

Colombia to Receive 63 Helicopters in U.S. Aid

The Clinton administration announced January 11 a proposed $1.3 billion aid package to Colombia, including delivery to trained counternarcotics battalions of 30 UH-60L Blackhawk helicopters and 33 UH-1N Huey utility helicopters worth $600 million. The helicopters are for use in an operation to push into coca-growing regions of southern Colombia, which the White House claims are "dominated by insurgent guerrillas."

Another $340 million of the aid package will be devoted to enhancing Colombian interdiction capabilities, such as upgrading airstrips and purchasing radar and aircraft. If approved by Congress, total U.S. aid to Bogota will equal $1.6 billion during the next two years.

Arturo Valenzuela, special assistant to the president for inter-American affairs, told the press in a January 11 briefing that Washington has no intention of getting involved in a counterinsurgency operation, but that the U.S. "concern and interest is to cut back on the capacity of narcotraffickers to produce [and] to ship in Colombia." The U.S. government estimates 80 percent of the cocaine entering the United States originates in or passes through Colombia.

Last fall, the Pentagon informed Congress that Colombia had requested 14 Blackhawks through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Congress opted not to block the sale within the mandated 30-day review period despite existing congressional criticism of Colombia's poor human rights record. It is unclear whether Colombia will still pursue the FMS buy after the announcement of the aid package.

U.S., North Korea Resume Bilateral Talks

Representatives of the United States and North Korea met in Berlin from January 22-28 in a continuing effort to improve their bilateral relationship and to address U.S. concerns about North Korea's ballistic missile program. Ambassador Charles Kartman, U.S. special envoy for the Korean peace talks, led a delegation to meet the North Koreans, headed by Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan. Though no substantive matters were settled, the parties agreed to meet again at the end of February to cement the agenda for a March visit to Washington by a high-level North Korean delegation. In September 1999, similar high-level discussions preceded a partial lifting of U.S. economic sanctions and a corresponding North Korean pledge to suspend missile testing for the duration of the ongoing talks. (See ACT, September/October 1999.)

Pyongyang's missile pledge was brought to the fore immediately prior to the commencement of the January talks. The Korean Central News Agency, the press organ of the North Korean government, quoted a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official who indicated that the January 18 test of the U.S. national missile defense system could lead to the resumption of Pyongyang's missile program. "The U.S. behavior has compelled the DPRK to take our moratorium into a serious consideration. We will make an appropriate decision, watching its future movement," he said.

The meeting also followed another minor controversy about the relative sophistication of North Korea's missile program. Commercial satellite photographs first made public January 3 by the Cable News Network revealed a primitive missile facility lacking several components commonly associated with Western test programs, including rail links, substantial infrastructure and propellant storage areas, suggesting the danger from North Korea might not be as great as Washington has maintained. State Department spokesman James Rubin dismissed the notion that the threat was exaggerated: "It is our judgment from a panoply of intelligence sources and methods...that there is a genuine threat and a risk from the potential missile program of North Korea."