NEWS BRIEFS

Patriot and Arrow Pass, THAAD Fails

Administration Releases NATO Expansion Cost Report

Iraqi Missile Parts Arrive in U.S. for Tests

Air Force Deploys 'New' Earth Penetrating Warhead

Development of the B61 11 has been controversial. Some critics have argued that it would undermine the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty because it would be seen as a "new" weapon that was developed after the treaty's signature in September 1996. They contend that the B61 11 is a new weapon because it gives the United States a new capability¾to destroy deeply buried targets, such as command and control bunkers. The position of the U.S. government is that the B61 11 is only a modification of the existing B61 7 bomb and that it utilizes an existing nuclear package that has not required a nuclear test.

Some critics have also argued that development of the B61 11 may call into question U.S. "negative security assurances," whereby the United States has pledged not to use nuclear weapons against any non nuclear weapon state party to the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) unless attacked by such a state that is allied with a nuclear weapon state. Although subsequently repudiated, Harold Smith, assistant to the secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs, asserted in April 1996 that the B61 11 could be used to destroy a suspected underground chemical weapons facility under construction in Libya, a member of the NPT.

Patriot and Arrow Pass, THAAD Fails

The U.S. Army's improved Patriot ballistic missile defense system successfully intercepted a Scud missile target during a March 20 test in the central Pacific Ocean¾marking the system's second successful intercept of such a missile target in two attempts. The system, a more advanced version of the Patriot deployed during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, achieved its first intercept of a Scud class target on February 7.

In addition, on March 11, the U.S. Israeli Arrow II ballistic missile defense system successfully intercepted a missile target in Israel for the second time in two test attempts. The Arrow II system, which could be ready for limited deployment as early as 1998, achieved its first intercept of a missile target on August 20, 1996. Arrow II is designed to defend fixed sites in Israel against Scud type ballistic missile threats.

However, on March 6, the Army's mobile Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system failed to intercept a ballistic missile target at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, for the fourth consecutive time, seriously calling into question whether the system will be ready for initial deployment in 2004 as presently intended. THAAD's three previous intercept failures occurred on December 13, 1995, March 22, 1996, and July 15, 1996.

Administration Releases NATO Expansion Cost Report

On February 24, the Clinton administration released its "Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of NATO: Rationale, Benefits, Costs, and Implications." The study, conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD), estimated the cost of NATO enlargement will total $27 billion to $35 billion over a 13 year period, beginning in July 1997, when the alliance is expected to extend invitations to new members at a NATO summit in Madrid.

DOD assumed the initial expansion would include a "small group of nonspecified Central European countries" integrated at a modest pace, reflecting the lack of any overt threat to the security environment. The estimate assumed no substantial NATO forces or nuclear weapons would be permanently stationed on the new territories. Instead, the report foresees a rear guard strategy emphasizing rapid reinforcement capabilities. Earlier studies by RAND ($42 billion) and the Congressional Budget Office ($61 billion to $125 billion) based their estimates on a more extensive reconfiguration of NATO forces and alternative threat scenarios.

The DOD report estimated U.S. costs at $1.5 billion to $2 billion over 10 years. DOD assumed the United States would incur minimal costs for the restructuring of new members' militaries and for upgrading the regional reinforcement capabilities. The United States would be responsible for 15 percent of the direct costs of NATO enlargement, such as ensuring interoperability of forces and integrating command and control systems, while new and current members would account for the other 85 percent. Overall, the U.S. portion of total NATO expansion costs would be approximately 5 to 8 percent using the DOD estimates. The administration cautioned that this was not an official NATO position and that costs were subject to change if underlying assumptions proved incorrect.

Iraqi Missile Parts Arrive in U.S. for Tests

Parts from about 130 destroyed Iraqi missiles were shipped to the United States on March 9 for analysis to determine if Iraqi missile destruction complies with the UN mandate that ended the Persian Gulf War.

The missiles, which Iraq said it destroyed in April 1991 without UN supervision, may have included operational Soviet rocket motors as required by UN Security Council Resolution 687. But the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) charged with implementing the mandate, suspects that Iraq may have substituted worthless replicas. To verify Iraqi compliance, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, head of UNSCOM, insisted on exhuming the missile parts for analysis by an international team of experts. The parts were sent via Bahrain on March 8 to a U.S. Department of Defense laboratory in Huntsville, Alabama, after an agreement for their removal was reached in Baghdad between Ekeus and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minsiter Tariq Aziz. UNSCOM expects metallurgical tests to show whether the missile parts came from functional Soviet produced systems, and whether critical components that Iraq cannot produce domestically were removed before the missiles were destroyed.